Talos Details Qakbot Campaign Using Hijacked Email Threads Harvested from Other Organizations

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Summary

Talos describes a Qakbot campaign that used old email threads likely harvested during ProxyLogon compromises to craft phishing emails, and outlines indicators that distinguish this external thread hijacking from attacks using a victim’s own email system.

Key points

  • Talos observed the campaign in June 2022; it used old emails likely harvested from multiple organizations during 2021 ProxyLogon compromises.
  • Attackers selected threads involving target organizations, added malicious content, and sent phishing emails from external mailboxes.
  • Unlike victim thread hijacking, this method did not require access to the target organization’s Exchange server or inboxes.
  • Indicators include spoofed external senders, old threads, few internal-to-internal exchanges, malformed replies, and partially removed email addresses.
  • Talos also observed repeated use of the same harvested threads across multiple phishing waves.
  • Qakbot can steal financial and login information and load additional malware; Talos notes Snort rules and ClamAV signatures can detect it.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • In the June 2022 campaign, attackers used old email threads likely harvested from multiple organizations during 2021 ProxyLogon-related compromises to craft phishing emails targeting senders or recipients at other organizations.
  • Attackers reportedly added malicious content to legitimate email-thread text and sent the resulting phishing emails from spoofed external mailboxes.
  • In the described victim-thread-hijacking approach, attackers compromise a target organization's Exchange server or an individual email account, then use legitimate threads to craft and send malicious replies.
Defensive Notes
  • Look for spoofed external sender addresses, old email threads, few internal-to-internal threads, malformed replies, and email addresses partially removed from message bodies.
  • Check for repeated use of the same harvested email threads across multiple phishing waves.
  • Cisco Talos notes that Snort rules and ClamAV signatures can detect Qakbot deployment and that Snort rules can detect and prevent additional malware loaded from Qakbot C2 servers.

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