Prometei Botnet Adds Self-Updating, C2 and Web Shell Capabilities

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Summary

Cisco Talos details Prometei v3 updates observed since November 2022, including a new domain-generation algorithm, self-updating mechanism and bundled web shell. Sinkhole data indicated more than 10,000 infected systems worldwide.

Key points

  • Talos estimates Prometei v3 infected more than 10,000 systems worldwide, based on a week of sinkhole data from February 2023.
  • The botnet uses PowerShell to download and run components, establishes persistence through Windows services, and spreads through SMB, SSH, RDP and SQL servers.
  • Prometei primarily deploys a Monero miner and also harvests credentials using a Mimikatz variant; Talos describes the activity as financially motivated and opportunistic.
  • Newly observed capabilities include a domain-generation algorithm producing up to 48 potential C2 domains per day and a self-updating process that replaces bot components.
  • Prometei deployed an Apache server with a PHP web shell on victim hosts, creating a command-execution and file-upload capability.
  • The botnet’s Tor configuration now excludes Russia only; Talos says this may reflect a change in targeting but describes the conflict connection as an assessment.
  • Talos considers the botnet ongoing and likely to evolve; it lists Cisco security products, Snort rules and ClamAV signatures as available defenses.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Prometei spreads through SMB, SSH, RDP, and lateral movement attempts against SQL servers; the RDP module exploits BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708).
  • A malicious PowerShell command downloads and executes Prometei components from C2 servers, with additional components delivered in 7-Zip archives.
  • Prometei deploys a bundled Apache Web Server with a PHP web shell on victim hosts; the shell can execute commands and copy uploaded files.
  • The bot deploys a Monero miner and harvests credentials, including through a Mimikatz variant.
Defensive Notes
  • Cisco Talos lists Cisco Secure Endpoint, Cisco Secure Email, Cisco Secure Firewall, Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analytics, Cisco Secure Malware Analytics, Umbrella, Cisco Secure Web Appliance, Cisco Duo, Snort, and ClamAV protections.
  • Snort SIDs 54610–54612 and 61426–61429 are listed as defenses against this threat.
  • Applicable ClamAV signatures listed are Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-6, Win.Coinminer.Generic-7151250-0, Win.Malware.Tgqv7oji-9939403-0, Win.Trojan.Mimikatz-6466236-0, and Win.Trojan.Prometei-8977166-0.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINxinchaoabcdcf[.]orgExample Prometei DGA domain observed in nslookup telemetry; generated for potential C2 use.
DOMAINxinchaocecclk[.]netExample Prometei DGA domain observed in nslookup telemetry; generated for potential C2 use.
DOMAINxinchaocecclk[.]orgExample Prometei DGA domain observed in nslookup telemetry; generated for potential C2 use.
DOMAINxinchaodbcdbh[.]comExample Prometei DGA domain observed in nslookup telemetry; generated for potential C2 use.
DOMAINxinchaodbcdbh[.]orgExample Prometei DGA domain observed in nslookup telemetry; generated for potential C2 use.
IPV4103[.]65[.]236[.]53Mining pool address used in the Prometei miner command.
IPV4177[.]73[.]237[.]55Mining pool address in a replacement miner command supplied by the C2.
IPV4221[.]120[.]144[.]101Mining pool address in a replacement miner command supplied by the C2.

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