TA-NATALSTATUS Turns Exposed Redis Servers Into Persistent Cryptojacking Infrastructure

Summary
CloudSEK details TA-NATALSTATUS’s use of exposed, unauthenticated Redis servers to install persistent cryptominers, evade detection, and scan for more victims. The report includes indicators, investigation steps, and remediation guidance.
Key points
- The actor targets publicly exposed, unauthenticated Redis servers, using Redis commands to write a malicious root cron job when Redis runs with root privileges.
- Its malware mines cryptocurrency, hides processes by replacing system binaries, renames download tools, alters file timestamps, and disables host defenses.
- Compromised hosts scan for new Redis victims using distributed address-space scanning and can download and compile scanning tools.
- Hourly persistence scripts reinstall components; immutable file attributes and an SSH backdoor key help maintain access.
- The report provides malware paths, domains including natalstatus[.]org and avspbx[.]com, IP addresses, hashes, and indicators associated with rival cryptojacking campaigns.
- CloudSEK recommends isolating and re-imaging affected hosts where possible, removing persistence and backdoors, restoring system binaries, and restricting Redis to localhost with authentication.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- TA-NATALSTATUS scans for publicly exposed, unauthenticated Redis servers, including on port 6379, using masscan.
- When Redis is running as root, the actor uses Redis CONFIG SET and SAVE commands to write a malicious cron job into /var/spool/cron/root, which downloads and executes malware.
- Compromised hosts are used to scan additional IPv4 address space and propagate the infection.
- Defensive Notes
- Isolate suspected infected hosts and re-image them from a known-good backup where possible.
- Secure Redis with a strong password and configure it to listen only on the local interface; do not run Redis as root.
- Check cron locations for suspicious jobs, inspect files for immutable attributes, check authorized_keys for the key comment uc1, and verify that system binaries such as ps, top, curl, and wget have not been replaced.
- Restore altered system binaries and remove persistence mechanisms and backdoor files after unlocking immutable files.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | a[.]natalstatus[.]org | Listed as a confirmed malicious domain associated with TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| DOMAIN | avspbx[.]com | Listed as a confirmed malicious domain associated with TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| DOMAIN | dev[.]fugglesoft[.]me | Identified as a pool domain associated with the threat activity. |
| DOMAIN | en2an[.]top | Listed as a confirmed malicious domain associated with TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| DOMAIN | natalstatus[.]org | Listed as a confirmed malicious domain associated with TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| DOMAIN | pyats[.]top | Listed as a confirmed malicious domain associated with TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 103[.]79[.]77[.]16 | Listed as confirmed malicious C2 or mining-pool infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 104[.]248[.]4[.]162 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 107[.]174[.]47[.]156 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 107[.]174[.]47[.]181 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 121[.]42[.]151[.]137 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 144[.]217[.]45[.]45 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 176[.]31[.]6[.]16 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 181[.]214[.]87[.]241 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]19[.]33[.]145 | Listed as confirmed malicious C2 or mining-pool infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 188[.]209[.]49[.]54 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 194[.]110[.]247[.]97 | Listed as confirmed malicious C2 or mining-pool infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 200[.]68[.]17[.]196 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]76[.]122[.]92 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]89[.]52[.]41 | Listed as confirmed malicious C2 or mining-pool infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 46[.]243[.]253[.]15 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 51[.]15[.]56[.]161 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 51[.]38[.]191[.]178 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 51[.]38[.]203[.]146 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 79[.]137[.]195[.]151 | Listed as confirmed malicious C2 or mining-pool infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 80[.]211[.]206[.]105 | Listed as confirmed malicious C2 or mining-pool infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 83[.]220[.]169[.]247 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| IPV4 | 89[.]35[.]39[.]78 | Listed as rival malware infrastructure targeted for termination by TA-NATALSTATUS. |
| SHA256 | 04ae5583ebb88d197f203da92cbc17e5deedd2dc2297b30713ffe697102766b8 | Hash listed for the rs.sh malware script. |
| SHA256 | 254d0672515295890354a58cb6f83758e8eceee9bb5b7c5be08813496e59f24a | Hash listed for the ndt.sh malware script. |
| SHA256 | 58eeceb920a460a5f389acb23e5f8d86c3391788f9c9f5a4b396e3f4f84782c3 | Hash listed for a malware-related file identified as Dat file. |
| SHA256 | cc6e21845299c549a439321ff00033caa56e6c28c039b3316b808698f14344c7 | Hash listed for a malware-related file named script.sh. |
| SHA256 | f0ff790b0eb3479ab90889223b88826be95051a7170285774b4a06b6d34d0771 | Hash listed for the nnt.sh malware script. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1036.003 · Rename Legitimate UtilitiesThe actor replaces ps and top with wrappers that hide its processes, and renames curl and wget to cd1 and wd1.T1053.003 · CronRedis commands write malicious cron jobs that execute malware, and an hourly cron job reinstalls the malware suite.T1070.006 · TimestompThe actor alters file timestamps to make malware files appear older.T1098.004 · SSH Authorized KeysThe actor establishes persistent access with an SSH backdoor key added to authorized_keys.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe infection scripts download malware and, when package installation fails, download scanner source code from the C2 server.T1496 · Resource HijackingThe compromised systems run cryptocurrency-mining malware that consumes host CPU resources.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsThe scripts disable SELinux and flush host firewall rules to weaken host defenses.T1595.001 · Scanning IP BlocksThe actor uses masscan to scan internet-facing IPv4 addresses for exposed, unauthenticated Redis servers.
Threat Actors
Malware
cnrigxmrig, xmrig-cpu, xmr-stak, cnrig, minerdDDGterminating dozens of processes associated with competing cryptojacking campaigns like Kinsing and DDG to ensure 100% of the host's CPU resources are dedicated to their miner.httpgdlike ps and top to ps.original and replacing them with malicious wrappers, they filter their own malware (httpgd) out of the output. An admin looking for the miner won't see it using standard tools.kdevtmpfsiKinsing / kdevtmpfsiKinsing(see Appendix), terminating dozens of processes associated with competing cryptojacking campaigns like Kinsing and DDG to ensure 100% of the host's CPU resources are dedicated to their miner.minerdxmrig, xmrig-cpu, xmr-stak, cnrig, minerdWatchbogWatchbog / Watchd0gWatchd0gWatchbog / Watchd0gxmr-stakxmrig, xmrig-cpu, xmr-stak, cnrig, minerdXMRigxmrig, xmrig-cpu, xmr-stak, cnrig, minerdxmrig-cpuxmrig, xmrig-cpu, xmr-stak, cnrig, minerd
Products
RedisIt starts like most cryptojacking alerts do: an exposed Redis port, a suspicious process, maybe a spike in CPU usage. Easy to ignore. Easy to wipe. Until it isn't. Because some miners aren’t just smash-and-grabSELinuxany payload is dropped, the script performs a series of "hostile sysadmin" actions, including disabling SELinux (setenforce 0), massively increasing the file descriptor limit (ulimit -n 65535), and tearing down host
Tools
BeVigilOur investigation began when CloudSEK’s BeVigil detected an open Redis instance within one of our client’s infrastructure. This exposed instance had been compromised by a cryptominer, which triggered a deepermasscanThe attacker uses tools like masscan to scan the internet for publicly exposed, unauthenticated Redis servers on port 6379.pnscanthe result through grep -v explicitly filtering out the names of its own miner (httpgd) and scanner (pnscan). The administrator's primary tool for process visibility is now actively lying to them.
Countries
AustraliaAustraliaBrazilBrazilCanadaCanadaChinaChinaFinland41% in FinlandFrance23% in FranceGermany33% in GermanyHong KongHong KongIndiaIndiaIndonesiaIndonesiaIrelandIrelandJapanJapanNetherlandsNetherlandsRussiaAnd 39% in RussiaSingaporeSingaporeSouth KoreaSouth KoreaUnited Kingdom27% in the United KingdomUnited StatesOver 17% of Redis servers in the United States remain exposedVietnamVietnam