Researchers Find PlugX Builder, Controller and Possible Victim Data on Exposed Server

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Summary

Hunt researchers found an exposed server containing a PlugX builder and controller, Korplug samples, and files that may contain data from infected hosts. A VBA script downloaded PlugX files from a Nepalese government website.

Key points

  • The exposed Czech-hosted server held an outdated PlugX builder and controller, alongside logs, encrypted files, and a directory with more than 50 possible host entries.
  • The builder can configure C2 settings, proxies, persistence, process injection, keylogging, and screen recording; the controller supports remote commands, file transfers, and log access.
  • A VBA script downloaded three PlugX files from a Nepalese government website, which the researchers believe had been compromised; Hunt shared its findings with Nepal CERT.
  • Samples used the PlugX “trinity” workflow: a legitimate executable, a sideloaded DLL, and a payload. Researchers also found Korplug samples and offensive security tools.
  • Additional Korplug files communicated with a VPS in India; the researchers cited Apache 1.3.27 on ports 80 and 443 as characteristic of PlugX activity.
  • Hunt reported that the files remained accessible as of May 26 and urged defenders to monitor exposed directories and older malware.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A VBA script disguised as a text file downloads three PlugX files from a Nepalese government website that the article says was compromised, then executes one of them.
  • The PlugX execution chain uses a legitimate executable vulnerable to DLL sideloading, an accompanying DLL, and a payload.
  • The builder supports configuring process injection, persistence through a selected registry location, and C2 communications over HTTP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, or DNS.
Defensive Notes
  • Monitor exposed directories and older malware samples, which the article reports can remain active threats.
  • Investigate unexpected hosting of malware files on legitimate websites, including government websites.
  • Review systems for PlugX/Korplug artifacts and behavior, including suspicious DLL sideloading and C2 activity.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
SHA25601f11f89c1ef84e60068e60a6d9dff2d2277341673a981ecbf864dcaf72e7f30SHA-256 listed for fscan.rar in the article's indicators.
SHA2561c3954b25fe7d32b72c8c8d7d9b6a1a3b9ff4d175b55cbaade435e0c770d0595SHA-256 listed for 111.exe, identified in the article as following the PlugX execution workflow.
SHA256285f9d4a3d5511e68ccc9ff14f209ac6cfdc0c3a51063d217190d5b8d49c2e47SHA-256 listed for lable.icon, identified as a modified version of Nmap and as a Korplug variant.
SHA2563a5088295708d3304f06de0499b9243bfbd68d14878615c531f0e346f47b389dSHA-256 listed for 1.jpg in the article's indicators.
SHA25676d590c38387f6042ad39b20cd86ea5a0f2632889e4dd18d67d2a7a188d20890SHA-256 listed for lable.rar in the article's indicators.
SHA256a9cec009503d067f241b5eddaea4e42c38edcb0b57c1b46e946c5281b7f1ea21SHA-256 listed for rar.exe in the article's indicators.
SHA256b150773df7b525ce2b70822a06c06241f251eae96c9ee12fc97776d3826d36a7SHA-256 listed for x3avast.exe in the article's indicators.

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