Darktrace Details ClickFix Attacks Using PowerShell and Data Exfiltration

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Summary

Darktrace analyzed ClickFix attacks that used fake verification prompts to induce PowerShell execution, followed by C2 communications and data exfiltration. Its monitoring detected malicious activity, and Autonomous Response blocked connections in a separate case.

Key points

  • ClickFix prompts imitate CAPTCHA checks or routine fixes, tricking users into pasting and running malicious PowerShell commands.
  • Darktrace investigated attacks across customer environments and detailed an April 9, 2025 incident; initial access in that case was outside its visibility.
  • The compromised device contacted C2 infrastructure, downloaded a numerically named file, and sent system information through HTTP POST requests.
  • Darktrace observed further connections associated with ClickFix campaigns and activity indicating automated data egress.
  • In the investigated incident, response actions required manual implementation, allowing the attack to escalate.
  • In a separate case, Autonomous Response blocked a connection one second after a suspicious file download, and the affected device was quarantined.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • ClickFix social engineering using fake error messages, verification prompts, or CAPTCHA prompts to persuade users to execute malicious PowerShell commands.
  • Spearphishing emails, malvertisements, and drive-by compromises can redirect users to malicious URLs.
  • Attackers may abuse trust in familiar online platforms such as GitHub to deliver malicious payloads.
  • Observed follow-on activity included downloading numerically named files, scanning internal system information, and sending data to C2 servers via HTTP POST.
Defensive Notes
  • Monitor for unusual PowerShell user agents and PowerShell execution, numerically named file downloads, and anomalous HTTP POST connections to external IP addresses.
  • Use network detection and response to identify unusual outbound connections and correlate related events across an attack chain.
  • The article reports that Darktrace Autonomous Response blocked connections to malicious endpoints and quarantined an affected device; without Autonomous Response enabled, proposed blocking actions required manual implementation.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINtlgrm-redirect[.]icuListed as possible C2 infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEdiagnostics[.]medgenome[.]comIdentified in the IOC list as a compromised website.
HOSTNAMErkuagqnmnypetvf[.]topListed as a C2 server.
IPV4138[.]199[.]156[.]22Identified as a C2 server; Darktrace Autonomous Response blocked connections to it.
IPV4141[.]193[.]213[.]10Listed as possible C2 infrastructure.
IPV4141[.]193[.]213[.]11Listed as possible C2 infrastructure.
IPV4168[.]119[.]96[.]41Listed as possible C2 infrastructure.
IPV4188[.]34[.]195[.]44Identified as a C2 server associated with ClickFix campaigns.
IPV4193[.]36[.]38[.]237Identified as a C2 endpoint used for HTTP communications and data exfiltration.
IPV4205[.]196[.]186[.]70Listed as possible C2 infrastructure.
IPV4212[.]237[.]217[.]182Listed as possible C2 infrastructure.
IPV4216[.]245[.]184[.]181Listed as possible C2 infrastructure.
IPV464[.]94[.]84[.]217Listed as possible C2 infrastructure.
IPV494[.]181[.]229[.]250Listed as possible C2 infrastructure.
SHA110a5eab3eef36e75bd3139fe3a3c760f54be33e3Listed as the hash of a possible malicious file.
SHA25634ff2f72c191434ce5f20ebc1a7e823794ac69bba9df70721829d66e7196b044Listed as the hash of a possible malicious file.

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