Recorded Future Sees High State Surveillance Risk in 31 Countries

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Summary

Recorded Future assesses state digital surveillance risk in 193 countries, finding high or very high risk in 31. The report details government surveillance capabilities, oversight concerns, risks to travelers and organizations, and recommended mitigations.

Key points

  • The report rates six countries as very high risk and 25 as high risk, citing advanced surveillance capabilities, limited oversight, and surveillance of foreign nationals, businesses, or government critics.
  • Its assessment considers surveillance capabilities, governments’ history of digital surveillance, and the strength of oversight mechanisms.
  • The report groups capabilities into network interception, endpoint compromise, platform-level access, public-space surveillance, and data aggregation.
  • Examples include telecommunications interception, commercial spyware, government access to platform data, facial recognition, and collection of biometric information.
  • Weak safeguards and broad data collection can expose travelers and organizations to data loss, intellectual-property theft, legal or physical risks, and reputational harm.
  • Recommended precautions vary by destination risk, ranging from standard security hygiene to using sterile, non-corporate devices in high-risk jurisdictions.

Article Details

Publisher
Recorded Future
Report Period
Data collected from 2024 to 2026
Scope
Government digital surveillance risks to foreign nationals and business travelers, assessed through capabilities, surveillance history, and oversight.
Sample Size
193 countries
Key Statistics
  • Insikt Group assessed six countries (3%) as very high risk: Belarus, China, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia.
  • Insikt Group assessed 25 countries (13%) as high risk, citing moderate to advanced surveillance capabilities, limited independent oversight, and surveillance used against domestic opposition.
  • Insikt Group assessed 74 countries (38%) as medium risk: 19 with advanced capabilities not typically used unlawfully, and 55 with less advanced capabilities frequently used against dissent and activism.
  • Insikt Group assessed 65 countries (34%) as low risk: 39 with moderate to advanced capabilities exercised under strong oversight, and 26 with limited capabilities.
  • Insikt Group assessed 23 countries (12%) as very low risk, citing minimal surveillance capabilities, well-established oversight, and no indications of surveillance abuses.
Recommendations
  • For very high-risk destinations, avoid non-essential travel and assume devices will be compromised. If travel is unavoidable, use dedicated trip-only devices with minimized sensitive data, avoid personal and corporate accounts, and transport devices in a Faraday bag.
  • For high-risk destinations, restrict sensitive-data access and non-essential account logins; install firmware and operating system patches before departure; use legally permissible VPNs and end-to-end encrypted messaging installed before travel.
  • Avoid domestically developed communication applications in high-risk destinations, or use a separate device for them.
  • For medium-risk destinations, update applications, train travelers to recognize social engineering and physical device risks, restrict social media privacy settings, and avoid sharing sensitive political or social content. Monitor weakening oversight where advanced surveillance capabilities exist.
  • Maintain baseline cyber hygiene across risk tiers: install security patches, download applications from verified providers through official stores, require authentication preferably with multiple factors, and avoid public Wi-Fi. Apply lower-tier precautions in higher-risk destinations.

MITRE ATT&CK

People

Threat Actors

Malware

CandiruMozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago — had deployed Predator or Candiru spyware.DevilsTongueassociated with the spyware vendor Candiru, including components likely used for deploying DevilsTongue spyware; at the time of reporting, five clusters were likely still active, including those linked toEagleMsgSpyresearchers at Lookout Threat Lab uncovered a “mobile phone judicial monitoring product” known as EagleMsgSpy, which has been operational since 2017 and is likely developed by Chinese software company WuhanGhostXSamples of leaked documents referred to a tool called GhostX, a Windows remote access trojan (RAT) that reportedly enables file browsing, screen monitoring, keystroke logging, and password extraction.NoviSpythat Serbian police and the Security Information Agency (BIA) used Cellebrite products to install NoviSpy –– an Android spyware that captures data and remotely activates the device's microphone and camera –– onPegasusCommercial spyware, such as NSO Group’s Pegasus, can be deployed on a victim’s device to exfiltrate files, activate microphones and cameras, and monitor activity in real time.PredatorMongolia, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago — had deployed Predator or Candiru spyware.ResidentBatIn December 2025, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) identified a previously unknown spyware called ResidentBat, which it assessed Belarus’s State Security Committee (KGB) had used since at least 2021 to access call logs,

Vendors

AnthropicFor example, Anthropic’s Claude Mythos model, which it has not released to the public, has prompted concerns over its reportedly unprecedented ability to identify and exploit cyber vulnerabilities.AskomMETCiting import-export data, RFE/RL’s Kazakh service found that Kazakh companies AskomMET and IRPLAB imported UFED systems from Georgian Digital Forensics, a regional representative of Cellebrite, three times in 2022–2023.CandiruMozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago — had deployed Predator or Candiru spyware.CellebriteDigital forensics tools, such as Cellebrite’s Universal Forensic Extraction Device (UFED), enable the recovery, preservation, and extraction of data on seized digital devices.China Electronics CorporationDPI technology from Geedge Networks shipped to the country by a subsidiary of the state-owned China Electronics Corporation.CitadelRussia’s largest SORM technology providers –– most notably, Citadel, Norsi-Trans, and Protei –– export to and participate in regional trade expositions in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, further indicatingDahuaSafe City projects, particularly those using solutions from Chinese technology firms Huawei, Dahua, and Hikvision, have proliferated in Africa, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe.ElCatIn July 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov signed a decree granting state-owned company ElCat a one-year monopoly over international internet bandwidth, effective August 15, 2025.Ethio Telecom2025, Ethiopian news outlet Borkena reported that Ethiopian telecommunications operators, including Ethio Telecom and Safaricom, implemented DPI technology to filter and monitor citizens’ communications on behalf ofFirst WapIn October 2025, a Lighthouse Reports investigation found that First Wap, a surveillance company registered in Indonesia, had marketed its Altamides technology for mobile device geolocation for use against IndonesianGeedge NetworksIn September 2025, InterSecLab reported that Geedge Networks, a private Chinese network intelligence company involved in developing provincial firewalls within China, exported surveillance and censorship capabilitiesGeorgian Digital ForensicsCiting import-export data, RFE/RL’s Kazakh service found that Kazakh companies AskomMET and IRPLAB imported UFED systems from Georgian Digital Forensics, a regional representative of Cellebrite, three times in 2022–2023.GMDSOFTThe Center for Forensic Expertise under Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Justice confirmed use of UFED, along with digital forensics software from South Korean software company GMDSOFT.HikvisionSafe City projects, particularly those using solutions from Chinese technology firms Huawei, Dahua, and Hikvision, have proliferated in Africa, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe.HuaweiSafe City projects, particularly those using solutions from Chinese technology firms Huawei, Dahua, and Hikvision, have proliferated in Africa, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe.I-SOONIn February 2024, an online leak of documents from private security contractor I-SOON, which has contracted with the MPS, detailed multiple tools I-SOON provided to a wide range of public sector clients in China.IRPLABCiting import-export data, RFE/RL’s Kazakh service found that Kazakh companies AskomMET and IRPLAB imported UFED systems from Georgian Digital Forensics, a regional representative of Cellebrite, three times in 2022–2023.KnownsecIn November 2025, leaked data from China-based cybersecurity firm Knownsec supported assessments that the company is almost certainly a trusted vendor for Chinese authorities and had very likely developed offensiveNorsi-TransRussia’s largest SORM technology providers –– most notably, Citadel, Norsi-Trans, and Protei –– export to and participate in regional trade expositions in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, further indicatingNSO GroupCommercial spyware, such as NSO Group’s Pegasus, can be deployed on a victim’s device to exfiltrate files, activate microphones and cameras, and monitor activity in real time.ParagonIn June 2025, Italy and Paragon spyware ended their contract following allegations that Rome used the spyware to target critics.ProteiRussia’s largest SORM technology providers –– most notably, Citadel, Norsi-Trans, and Protei –– export to and participate in regional trade expositions in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, further indicatingRecorded FutureInsikt Group regularly assesses risks to business travelers and foreign nationals from government-run digital surveillance operations in 193 countries using Recorded Future’s Country Risk analytic framework.Safaricomnews outlet Borkena reported that Ethiopian telecommunications operators, including Ethio Telecom and Safaricom, implemented DPI technology to filter and monitor citizens’ communications on behalf of Ethiopia’sSandvineMonitoring System, a national firewall first installed in 2019 using DPI capabilities from Canada-based Sandvine, now deploys DPI technology from Geedge Networks shipped to the country by a subsidiary of theSeptier CommunicationTEDIC also identified procurement records from the Ministry of the Interior in 2014 that awarded bids for unspecified interception equipment to Israeli firm Septier Communication, known for manufacturing IMSI catchers.TajiktelecomIn November 2025, Tajikistan launched a national messaging application, ORIZ, developed by the state-run Tajiktelecom, with all servers hosted within the country.Vas ExpertsAccording to Vas Experts, a Russian SORM provider, “the differences between the ETSI, CALEA, and SORM lawful interception models revolve around the role of law enforcement agencies in the interception process.” In theWuhan Chinasoft Token Information Technology Co., Ltd.been operational since 2017 and is likely developed by Chinese software company Wuhan Chinasoft Token Information Technology Co., Ltd., for use by public security bureaus.

Products

2GISThe activist alleged the Kazakh government had configured the 2GIS map application on their Xiaomi Redmi Note 10 smartphone to broadcast the device’s location upon internet connection.AadhaarFor example, in July 2025, Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding with India to collaborate on a digital ID system modeled after India’s Aadhaar system.AituSimilarly, in September 2025, Kazakhstan began shifting official communications to state-backed messenger Aitu.Altamidesinvestigation found that First Wap, a surveillance company registered in Indonesia, had marketed its Altamides technology for mobile device geolocation for use against Indonesian and global activists, journalists,AndroidThe tool, which targets Android devices, reportedly requires physical access to a device for installation and collects extensive data, including SMS and third-party chat messages, screen and audio recording, call logs,Claude MythosFor example, Anthropic’s Claude Mythos model, which it has not released to the public, has prompted concerns over its reportedly unprecedented ability to identify and exploit cyber vulnerabilities.DejaviewSouth Korea’s Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute announced the development of the “Dejaview” predictive policing system, which uses historical crime statistics to analyze real-time CCTV footage,Dynamic Control Platform for Overseas PersonnelNamed the “Dynamic Control Platform for Overseas Personnel,” the demo system aggregates access to information such as registered address, visa details, employer, frequently visited locations, physical movements, andECOWAS Biometric Identity Card2016-09, the ECOWAS Biometric Identity Card has been mandatory for citizens aged 15 or older since 2016 and is required to access mobile service, bank accounts, and public utilities.Great Firewall of ChinaAn example of an advanced traffic monitoring and DPI system is the “Great Firewall of China”, an informal term for the techniques Chinese authorities employ to inspect, manipulate, and block internet traffic, whichGuest List Management Systemdatabase includes SIM card registration records, national identity cards, CCTV networks, the Guest List Management System tracking stays at hotels, the Myanmar Advanced Passenger Processing System implemented atiPhoneHowever, the app reportedly requires access to cameras, photos, and files for iPhone users, and permissions to access call logs, send messages for registration, make and manage phone calls, and view cameras and photosKwangmyongFurther, the Kwangmyong application, which smartphone users must install to access North Korea’s intranet, reportedly enables the Ministry of State Security and other agencies to monitor users’ activities in real time.MaxSince mid-2025, the Russian government has widely promoted its state-backed messenger application, Max; blocked access to popular alternative applications, including WhatsApp and Telegram; and restricted access to VPNsMegaMarketof the anonymous browser Tor, and two applications –– the food delivery app Samokat and marketplace app MegaMarket –– obtained a list of all VPN apps installed on the device.Mobile User Identification AppNorth Korea’s “Mobile User Identification App” is a clear example of how the mandated installation of state-developed applications facilitates end-user surveillance by exploiting access to mobile devices.Myanmar Advanced Passenger Processing Systemcards, CCTV networks, the Guest List Management System tracking stays at hotels, the Myanmar Advanced Passenger Processing System implemented at airports, and the National Service Information Management System forNational Service Information Management Systemthe Myanmar Advanced Passenger Processing System implemented at airports, and the National Service Information Management System for identifying conscription and labor status.NazerIranian opposition media reported that the Iranian government had developed a mobile application called “Nazer” (ناظر), allowing volunteers vetted by the Police Command of Iran (FARAJA) to report unveiled women inORIZIn November 2025, Tajikistan launched a national messaging application, ORIZ, developed by the state-run Tajiktelecom, with all servers hosted within the country.Recorded Future Intelligence Operations PlatformCustomers can access Country Risk analysis by querying for State Surveillance Notes in the Recorded Future Intelligence Operations Platform.Red FlagIn 2017, security researchers analyzing North Korea’s Ullim tablet found pre-installed applications enabling government surveillance, including “Red Flag” software.Samokatalso searched for the use of the anonymous browser Tor, and two applications –– the food delivery app Samokat and marketplace app MegaMarket –– obtained a list of all VPN apps installed on the device.Sanchar SaathiIn December 2025, India revoked an order requiring smartphone manufacturers to pre-install the Sanchar Saathi cybersecurity application on all devices, following backlash from digital rights organizations and technologySchengen Information Systembiometric data “when national security is severely threatened,” and enable sharing with the Schengen Information System, which facilitates information-sharing on people and objects between over 300 European border,SORMthe United States (US), respectively — as well as Russia’s System for Operative-Investigative Activities (SORM).Telegrammessenger application, Max; blocked access to popular alternative applications, including WhatsApp and Telegram; and restricted access to VPNs used to circumvent such blocks.Tiangou Secure GatewayIn June 2024, Justice for Myanmar reported that Myanmar’s military junta uses Geedge Network’s Tiangou Secure Gateway (TSG), an internet surveillance and censorship product.Trace ViewerA second app, “Trace Viewer,” allows users to view (but not delete) the history recorded by Red Flag; researchers note that this app is provided to show Ullim tablet users that everything they do on the device isUllimIn 2017, security researchers analyzing North Korea’s Ullim tablet found pre-installed applications enabling government surveillance, including “Red Flag” software.Unified Biometric SystemIn July 2025, the Russian government approved a measure requiring foreigners receiving mobile phone services to submit biometric data to Russia’s Unified Biometric System (UBS), a state database.VenAppopenly encouraged Venezuelan citizens to inform on neighbors involved in anti-government protests via VenApp, a government application initially created to report public service failures.VKontakte30 popular Russian applications –– including the search engine Yandex, the social media platform VKontakte, and Sberbank’s mobile banking application –– and found that 22 of them actively detected VPN use and 19Web Monitoring SystemA September 2025 Amnesty International report found that Pakistan’s Web Monitoring System, a national firewall first installed in 2019 using DPI capabilities from Canada-based Sandvine, now deploys DPI technology fromWhatsAppIn January 2025, WhatsApp notified approximately 90 account users in two dozen countries that they had been targeted with Paragon’s spyware, including journalists and members of civil society.Xiaomi Redmi Note 10The activist alleged the Kazakh government had configured the 2GIS map application on their Xiaomi Redmi Note 10 smartphone to broadcast the device’s location upon internet connection.YandexAn RKS Global investigation analyzed 30 popular Russian applications –– including the search engine Yandex, the social media platform VKontakte, and Sberbank’s mobile banking application –– and found that 22 of them

Tools

Countries

AngolaFrom 2024 to 2026, Insikt Group investigations found evidence that at least sixteen countries — including Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia,Armeniato 2026, Insikt Group investigations found evidence that at least sixteen countries — including Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq,AzerbaijanInsikt Group investigations found evidence that at least sixteen countries — including Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan,BelarusSix countries (3%) –– Belarus, China, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia –– are “very high risk,” denoting evidence of advanced surveillance capabilities, a lack of independent oversight, regular surveillanceBotswanainvestigations found evidence that at least sixteen countries — including Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia,CambodiaIn October 2025, Nikkei reported that Cambodia plans to build key infrastructure for the pending National Internet Gateway in 2026.ChinaSix countries (3%) –– Belarus, China, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia –– are “very high risk,” denoting evidence of advanced surveillance capabilities, a lack of independent oversight, regular surveillanceCubaIn January 2025, Insikt Group assessed that Belarus, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, and Uzbekistan almost certainly purchased technologies from eight Russian SORM vendors.Democratic Republic of the Congothat at least sixteen countries — including Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, theEcuadorEcuador’s June 2025 Organic Law of Intelligence compels telecommunications providers to share historical and real-time information on subscribers’ communications and connections with the National Intelligence SystemEgyptcountries — including Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, andEthiopiaChina, exported surveillance and censorship capabilities similar to the Great Firewall to Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Myanmar between 2019 and 2025.FinlandIn February 2025, Finland’s Ministry of the Interior proposed amendments to biometric data regulations that would allow law enforcement to use biometric data collected in existing passport and identity card registersHungary— including Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad andIndiaIn December 2025, India revoked an order requiring smartphone manufacturers to pre-install the Sanchar Saathi cybersecurity application on all devices, following backlash from digital rights organizations and technologyIndonesiaAngola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago —IranSix countries (3%) –– Belarus, China, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia –– are “very high risk,” denoting evidence of advanced surveillance capabilities, a lack of independent oversight, regular surveillanceIraqArmenia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago — hadItalyIn June 2025, Italy and Paragon spyware ended their contract following allegations that Rome used the spyware to target critics.JordanIn 2023, Human Rights Watch documented 45 cases in which security services in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia arrested individuals and attempted to collect digital evidence of their sexual orientation from theirKazakhstanIn January 2025, Insikt Group assessed that Belarus, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, and Uzbekistan almost certainly purchased technologies from eight Russian SORM vendors.KyrgyzstanIn January 2025, Insikt Group assessed that Belarus, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, and Uzbekistan almost certainly purchased technologies from eight Russian SORM vendors.LebanonIn 2023, Human Rights Watch documented 45 cases in which security services in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia arrested individuals and attempted to collect digital evidence of their sexual orientation from theirMongoliaBotswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago — had deployed Predator orMozambiquethe Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago — had deployed Predator or CandiruMyanmarSix countries (3%) –– Belarus, China, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia –– are “very high risk,” denoting evidence of advanced surveillance capabilities, a lack of independent oversight, regular surveillanceNicaraguaIn January 2025, Insikt Group assessed that Belarus, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, and Uzbekistan almost certainly purchased technologies from eight Russian SORM vendors.North KoreaSix countries (3%) –– Belarus, China, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia –– are “very high risk,” denoting evidence of advanced surveillance capabilities, a lack of independent oversight, regular surveillanceOmanDemocratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago — had deployed Predator or Candiru spyware.Pakistanexported surveillance and censorship capabilities similar to the Great Firewall to Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Myanmar between 2019 and 2025.ParaguayPeruracial, ethnic and religious minorities in particular.” Reflecting these risks, in September 2025, Peru adopted legislation regulating the use of AI in the public sector, including defining “improper use” of AIPhilippinesof the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago — had deployed Predator or Candiru spyware.PolandIn the lead-up to Poland’s 2019 parliamentary elections, Pegasus spyware was used to surveil then-opposition candidate Krzysztof Brejza 33 times, and Brejza’s text messages were subsequently obtained, doctored, andRussiaSix countries (3%) –– Belarus, China, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia –– are “very high risk,” denoting evidence of advanced surveillance capabilities, a lack of independent oversight, regular surveillanceSaudi ArabiaCongo (DRC), Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago — had deployed Predator or Candiru spyware.SenegalIn February 2025, Senegal launched a digital strategy aiming for 90% adoption of a digital ID by 2034.SerbiaSouth KoreaIn July 2024, South Korea’s Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute announced the development of the “Dejaview” predictive policing system, which uses historical crime statistics to analyze real-time CCTVSwitzerlandIn January 2025, Switzerland proposed metadata retention requirements for service providers with more than 5,000 users, including VPNs, encrypted email, and messaging platforms, to collect government-issuedTürkiyeFollowing large-scale protests in Türkiye in March 2025 triggered by the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, Turkish authorities deployed AI-powered facial recognition systems to identify and detain protesters.TajikistanIn November 2025, Tajikistan launched a national messaging application, ORIZ, developed by the state-run Tajiktelecom, with all servers hosted within the country.Trinidad and TobagoIndonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago — had deployed Predator or Candiru spyware.TunisiaIn 2023, Human Rights Watch documented 45 cases in which security services in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia arrested individuals and attempted to collect digital evidence of their sexual orientation from theirUnited KingdomIn April 2026, the United Kingdom’s (UK) National Cyber Security Centre assessed that the targeting scope of commercial spyware had expanded to more frequently include bankers and executives.United StatesAssistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) — which establish LI standards in Europe and the United States (US), respectively — as well as Russia’s System for Operative-Investigative Activities (SORM).UzbekistanIn January 2025, Insikt Group assessed that Belarus, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, and Uzbekistan almost certainly purchased technologies from eight Russian SORM vendors.VenezuelaIn Venezuela, an October 2013 decree created the now-defunct Strategic Center for Security and Homeland Protection (CESPPA), responsible for collecting information “of strategic interest” to the Venezuelan government.VietnamVietnam’s Decree 147, in effect from December 2024, compels social media platforms that provide services to individuals in Vietnam to maintain user account information, login times, IP addresses, and activity logs for

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