Darktrace Details Vendor-Compromise Phishing Campaigns Using Trusted Email Relationships

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Summary

Darktrace describes four vendor-compromise campaigns targeting one customer in two weeks, using trusted senders, hijacked email threads, and legitimate file-sharing services to deliver fake Microsoft login pages and steal credentials.

Key points

  • The campaigns used compromised vendor or other organizational accounts to send convincing messages, sometimes inserted into existing email threads.
  • Messages linked to legitimate file-sharing services, which redirected recipients to fake Microsoft login pages designed to steal credentials.
  • Emails passed authentication checks and had a Microsoft Spam Confidence Level of 1, despite containing malicious links.
  • Reported anomalies included unfamiliar senders, unusual BCC use, first-time sharing of file-sharing links, and links that were unusually prominent or concealed.
  • Darktrace says it identified suspicious messages through behavioral and contextual signals without visiting the linked destinations.
  • In one customer environment with Autonomous Response enabled, Darktrace held detected emails before they reached recipients; in another, response was not enabled.
  • The article lists two phishing-page indicators of compromise and maps the activity to phishing under MITRE ATT&CK.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Compromise of vendor or other trusted-relationship email accounts to send phishing messages from trusted correspondents.
  • Insertion of malicious messages into existing email threads to blend in and evade detection.
  • Phishing links hosted on legitimate file-sharing services, sometimes leading through a CAPTCHA to fake Microsoft login pages designed to harvest credentials.
  • Use of homoglyphs in a phishing URL to make it resemble a legitimate service.
Defensive Notes
  • Monitor for out-of-character email behavior, including first-time sharing of file-sharing links, unusual link placement or concealment, and new senders using BCC to reach multiple recipients.
  • Use email detection that evaluates behavioral and contextual anomalies and can identify malicious links without visiting their destinations.
  • Enable response actions that hold suspicious emails before they reach recipients’ inboxes.
  • Remain alert to unexpected email activity even when messages come from trusted senders or pass email authentication checks.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
URLhxxp[:]//pub-ac94c05b39aa4f75ad1df88d384932b8[.]r2[.]dev/offline[.]htmlURL identified as a fake Microsoft login page used to capture credentials.
URLhxxp[:]//pub-ac94c05b39aa4f75ad1df88d384932b8[.]r2[.]dev/offline[.]html#pURL listed as a fake Microsoft login page.
URLhxxps[:]//s3[.]us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com/s3cure0line-0365cql0[.]19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2ml0qin/s3cccql0[.]19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2%26l0qn[.]html#Specific cloud-hosted phishing URL identified as a fake login page; its homoglyph spelling was used to deceive users.

MITRE ATT&CK

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