Malicious Python Scripts Abuse BoxedApp SDK to Hide and Run a DLL in Memory

· Original article ↗

Summary

Hunt researchers analyzed Python scripts that use the BoxedApp SDK to load a DLL from a password-protected archive in memory and relaunch a loader if it stops. The final payload could not be identified.

Key points

  • Researchers found the scripts in an archive containing Python 3.8 files; it may be linked to SilverFox, but the attribution is not confirmed.
  • The byte-compiled officehelper.py hides its execution window and uses the BoxedApp SDK to virtualize and load hello.dll without a conventional on-disk file.
  • The loader extracts hello.dll from the password-protected hello.zip archive.
  • The scriptforge.py watchdog uses a mutex and checks every eight seconds, restarting officehelper.py if its process is not running.
  • The article says the SDK's virtualized execution can hinder file-based detection and analysis.
  • Researchers could not determine the final malware verdict for the DLL.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A zip archive containing byte-compiled Python scripts and a password-protected archive is used to conceal and deliver a DLL.
  • officehelper.py uses the BoxedApp SDK to virtualize hello.dll and load it from memory.
  • scriptforge.py checks every 8 seconds whether officehelper.py is running and relaunches it if it is not.
  • The scripts hide their execution windows.
Defensive Notes
  • Use detection strategies that can identify malicious behavior beyond file-based and signature-based scanning.
  • Monitor for suspicious use of BoxedApp SDK functions to create virtual files and load DLLs from memory.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
SHA2564f4dc75447d40c43a6ae3743d442a70aa57f8299728031e2d01056ca04ba60f1Hash of officehelper.py, identified as byte-compiled code that extracts and loads hello.dll.
SHA25684a42aa1eafaa2ec7d10b85743adbe7fcf2f4a55beb3b36274edcab0b872b7e9Hash of scriptforge.py, identified as byte-compiled code used for persistence on a compromised host.
SHA256bf66eedcfcfa18dfa72ab81e9487a1cd009e210ab34f38dc9260568e169ffc8eHash of the password-protected hello.zip archive containing hello.dll.
SHA256e2361d2d3f547294c84c54901e5ec700100cbbfcc2aa41108e17df59e6e5a82bHash of hello.dll, identified as the suspicious DLL loaded by officehelper.py.
SHA256fa8109df69bfc045c272391b0a287e92e23767a40de9b9a9f1c3aec692a6e4aaHash of the original zip archive found on the virus-sample forum and potentially linked to the reported malware.

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