Dragos Reports Prompt Theft and Hidden Routing Across AI Inference Providers

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Summary

Dragos says canary-token tests uncovered prompt copying, credential misuse and undisclosed routing across AI inference providers. OpenRouter removed three providers and 125 endpoints from Zero Data Retention eligibility and notified potentially affected customers.

Key points

  • Dragos seeded about two million prompts with unique links and credentials from July to November; use of those canaries indicated that the prompts had been accessed.
  • Dragos reported that attackers copied provider traffic, including some requests rejected before model execution, and tested planted AWS keys, generating tens of thousands of AWS API calls.
  • Researchers found marketplace sellers logging inference requests and traced undisclosed traffic forwarding; one seller reportedly added about 1,000 hidden tokens to each prompt.
  • An unnamed Chinese AI lab fetched secret links from more than half of the seeded prompts sent to its models, including many marked as Zero Data Retention or no data collection.
  • OpenRouter removed three providers and 125 endpoints from Zero Data Retention eligibility, notified potentially affected customers, and said the findings did not indicate a breach of OpenRouter itself. It is unclear whether the removed providers are the three Dragos said were breached.
  • Phala reported an attacker accessed request data on an inference server; it contained the incident on November 8 and restored service with added protections. Together AI said an unauthorized party downloaded stored prompt samples after a credential was committed to its public GitHub repository.
  • Dragos advised customers to choose and verify upstream providers, avoid reseller marketplaces, and consider canary credentials and credential scrubbing; it said self-hosting avoids third-party prompt access.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Attackers reportedly compromised AI inference providers and copied customer requests as they arrived, including requests marked Zero Data Retention.
  • Some marketplace sellers enabled request logging and collected prompts routed through their models.
  • A routing configuration issue at Novita sent some MiniMax requests to MiniMax's official API beyond what customers intended.
  • At Together AI, an unauthorized party downloaded stored prompt samples after an AI coding agent committed a credential to the company's public GitHub repository.
  • An attacker reportedly used stolen AWS credentials to inspect cloud resources and attempt to establish additional access.
Defensive Notes
  • Rotate every key, token, password, or other secret contained in requests to DeepSeek V4 Flash 0731 that reached Phala through OpenRouter from 2026-10-21 00:00 UTC through 2026-11-08 05:35 UTC.
  • Choose upstream providers directly, verify that privacy settings actually change request routing, and avoid reseller marketplaces.
  • Verify network paths to identify whether requests and responses are forwarded to third parties.
  • Use planted canary credentials as tripwires, and scrub known credential formats from prompts while recognizing that this may miss other sensitive data.
  • Self-hosting avoids third-party prompt access; using a first-tier provider reduces the number of companies and privacy policies to assess.

MITRE ATT&CK

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