Rapid7 Attributes Custom SoftEther VPN Bridge to Webworm With Moderate Confidence

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Summary

Rapid7 analyzed a modified SoftEther VPN Bridge it attributes to Webworm with moderate confidence. The tool changes protocol endpoints and watermark, embeds resources, and encrypts configuration; Rapid7 also shares detection guidance and a decryptor.

Key points

  • Rapid7 analyzed a public sample of a modified SoftEther VPN Bridge and attributes it to Webworm with moderate confidence.
  • The sample rebrands SoftEther components as NtMonitor VPN and changes protocol endpoints and the handshake watermark to hinder fingerprinting.
  • The tool embeds a reduced hamcore.se2 resource archive in the executable, removing a recognizable installation artifact.
  • Its configuration is renamed setting.conf and encrypted with a custom RC4-like cipher; Rapid7 provides a Python decryptor.
  • Rapid7 found no additional malware functionality beyond the modified VPN bridge and its stealth changes.
  • Rapid7 provides IoCs and YARA rules, and recommends monitoring TLS traffic for POST requests to /update/picture.cgi with the described custom PNG watermark.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Webworm is reported to deploy SoftEther VPN in compromised government networks to maintain low-profile, long-term access.
  • The analyzed custom SoftEther-based bridge can connect a remote network to the compromised host’s local network.
  • The variant disguises itself through altered PE metadata and rebranded internal strings, replaces SoftEther HTTP endpoints and its protocol watermark, embeds a reduced resource archive in the executable, and uses encrypted configuration files.
Defensive Notes
  • Rapid7 recommends inspecting TLS traffic for POST requests to /update/picture.cgi with Content-Type: image/jpeg and a request body beginning with the specified PNG signature bytes.
  • Rapid7 provides IoCs and a YARA ruleset on its public GitHub repository and a Python script for decrypting the actor’s custom-encrypted configuration files.
  • Government-sector defenders are advised to learn intrinsic SoftEther VPN behavior because the variant’s branding, endpoints, and watermark can be changed easily.

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