Rapid7 Attributes Custom SoftEther VPN Bridge to Webworm With Moderate Confidence

Summary
Rapid7 analyzed a modified SoftEther VPN Bridge it attributes to Webworm with moderate confidence. The tool changes protocol endpoints and watermark, embeds resources, and encrypts configuration; Rapid7 also shares detection guidance and a decryptor.
Key points
- Rapid7 analyzed a public sample of a modified SoftEther VPN Bridge and attributes it to Webworm with moderate confidence.
- The sample rebrands SoftEther components as NtMonitor VPN and changes protocol endpoints and the handshake watermark to hinder fingerprinting.
- The tool embeds a reduced hamcore.se2 resource archive in the executable, removing a recognizable installation artifact.
- Its configuration is renamed setting.conf and encrypted with a custom RC4-like cipher; Rapid7 provides a Python decryptor.
- Rapid7 found no additional malware functionality beyond the modified VPN bridge and its stealth changes.
- Rapid7 provides IoCs and YARA rules, and recommends monitoring TLS traffic for POST requests to /update/picture.cgi with the described custom PNG watermark.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Webworm is reported to deploy SoftEther VPN in compromised government networks to maintain low-profile, long-term access.
- The analyzed custom SoftEther-based bridge can connect a remote network to the compromised host’s local network.
- The variant disguises itself through altered PE metadata and rebranded internal strings, replaces SoftEther HTTP endpoints and its protocol watermark, embeds a reduced resource archive in the executable, and uses encrypted configuration files.
- Defensive Notes
- Rapid7 recommends inspecting TLS traffic for POST requests to /update/picture.cgi with Content-Type: image/jpeg and a request body beginning with the specified PNG signature bytes.
- Rapid7 provides IoCs and a YARA ruleset on its public GitHub repository and a Python script for decrypting the actor’s custom-encrypted configuration files.
- Government-sector defenders are advised to learn intrinsic SoftEther VPN behavior because the variant’s branding, endpoints, and watermark can be changed easily.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1027.005 · Indicator Removal from ToolsThe modified build replaces recognizable SoftEther strings and endpoints and embeds a reduced resource archive in the executable.T1027.013 · Encrypted/Encoded FileThe modified loader handles configuration files encrypted with the actor’s custom RC4-like cipher.T1036.005 · Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationThe executable changes its PE metadata to present the OriginalFileName netcapa.exe and the purported publisher Network Systems Solutions Inc.T1071 · Application Layer ProtocolThe article’s ATT&CK mapping identifies HTTP(S) and SoftEther’s application protocol for the tool’s communications.T1090.001 · Internal ProxyThe article’s ATT&CK mapping describes the infected host as an internal proxy mediating access to other network hosts.T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThe article says the modified loader decrypts the encrypted configuration files at startup.T1587.001 · MalwareRapid7 describes the actor as maintaining a modified SoftEther VPN build for malicious use.T1599 · Network Boundary BridgingThe VPN is configured to bridge a remote network into the compromised host’s local network.T1686.003 · Windows Host FirewallThe article’s ATT&CK mapping says the tool uses stock SoftEther functionality to add rules to the Windows system firewall.
Threat Actors
Products
Tools
NtMonitor VPNHTTP 401 error page, or firewall rule names, where occurrences of “SoftEther VPN” are replaced by “NtMonitor VPN”.SoftEther VPN Bridgeon cleartext strings and constants in the binary, we identified it as a (modified) build of the SoftEther VPN Bridge executable, specifically version 4.44, build 9807. Similarly, the PDB path included in the
