Operation ArgonHunt Exposes Crypto Exchange Intrusion and AI API Key Theft

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Summary

SOCRadar researchers found an exposed server containing evidence of an intrusion into an unnamed Turkish crypto exchange and automated harvesting of 44,096 AI API keys. Forged withdrawals were attempts, not verified losses.

Key points

  • A Linux server exposed its temporary directory over HTTP port 8099, revealing about 700 MB of scripts, execution logs, and credentials.
  • Files indicated the operator gained read/write access to an unnamed Turkish cryptocurrency exchange’s production database; the exchange has not publicly confirmed the breach.
  • The operator’s scripts logged more than 200 forged withdrawal requests, but researchers did not verify on-chain settlement, so the amounts are not confirmed losses.
  • The server contained 44,096 unique AI API keys, 519 Google Cloud tokens, and logs indicating live service-account tokens were sniffed; recheck logs marked 2,686 keys active.
  • Researchers linked the exchange access to unsalted MD5 password hashes, 17 cracked staff passwords, Hydra brute forcing, and attempts to cycle through SMS one-time codes.
  • Custom tools reportedly used the MySQL general query log to write a PHP web shell and an InfluxDB subscription to attempt SSRF against internal panels.
  • SOCRadar shared victim-specific indicators privately; the article recommends auditing database access and withdrawals, replacing weak password hashes, and revoking potentially exposed API keys.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • An unsecured Linux server exposed its temporary directory over HTTP on port 8099, leaking scripts, execution logs, credentials, and other files.
  • The operator cracked 17 unsalted MD5 staff-password hashes and used Hydra to brute-force the exchange admin panel.
  • Scripts tried four- and six-digit SMS one-time codes across 12 parallel threads.
  • After gaining access, the operator used MySQL's general query log to write a PHP web shell into the web root.
  • An InfluxDB subscription was used to trigger server-side request forgery against internal panels.
  • The operator sniffed live service-account tokens and stored harvested AI API keys on the exposed server.
  • Drainer scripts changed withdrawal addresses in the database and forged requests from localhost to bypass application checks.
Defensive Notes
  • Audit databases for unauthorized withdrawal modifications and rogue MySQL accounts.
  • Replace legacy MD5 password hashes and enforce rate limits on SMS one-time codes.
  • Restrict database file privileges and block outbound InfluxDB subscription requests.
  • Scan public repositories and traffic logs for exposed API tokens; revoke suspected leaked keys and review billing logs for unauthorized compute usage.
  • Enforce strict IP allowlists and scope limits on cloud service tokens.

MITRE ATT&CK

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