Hornetsecurity Details November Device-Code Phishing Campaigns Using Payment Lures

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Summary

Hornetsecurity investigated November 2026 campaigns using payment-themed attachments, counterfeit SharePoint pages and Microsoft device authorization to trick Microsoft 365 users into granting access to attacker-controlled clients.

Key points

  • Payment-themed emails used ZIP, HTML and SVG attachments to lead recipients to counterfeit document-sharing pages.
  • One redirector recovered its destination through fragment reversal, substituted Base64 and repeating-key XOR; another rebuilt HTML from 475 obfuscated fragments.
  • The fake workspaces supplied device codes and directed users to Microsoft's genuine authorization page, where successful authorization gave the attacker-controlled client tokens for granted permissions.
  • Campaign pages used browser checks, session-status polling and heartbeat requests to coordinate the lure with backend activity.
  • Hornetsecurity recommends inspecting archived HTML attachments, correlating campaign visits with device-code sign-ins, and investigating successful sign-ins without a business purpose.
  • Organizations can restrict device-code flow with Conditional Access after testing the policy, and should investigate authorizations and sessions if a user completed an unsolicited flow.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Payment-themed phishing emails deliver ZIP or HTML attachments containing obfuscated HTML/SVG redirectors.
  • Clicking a full-canvas SVG verification prompt runs JavaScript that reconstructs a destination URL and redirects the browser to a counterfeit SharePoint-style payment-document workspace.
  • The counterfeit workspace supplies an attacker-initiated Microsoft device-authorization code and directs the recipient to enter it on Microsoft's genuine sign-in page; successful authorization provides tokens to the attacker-controlled requesting client.
  • Campaign pages use browser and interaction checks to divert some visits, and session-status and heartbeat requests to coordinate the lure with its backend.
Defensive Notes
  • Inspect archives and HTML attachments rather than relying on filenames; investigate payment-themed attachments containing interactive SVGs or encoded document-sharing pages.
  • Correlate visits to campaign hosts and session-specific status or heartbeat paths with device-code sign-ins, identity telemetry, accounts, applications, and timestamps.
  • In Microsoft Entra sign-in logs, investigate successful Device code authentication without an expected business purpose, including the application, account, source, and timing.
  • Audit legitimate device-code use and consider a Conditional Access policy that blocks Device code flow; test in report-only mode and retain carefully scoped exceptions.
  • Tell users to enter a device code only for a sign-in or device setup they intentionally initiated and understand. If an unsolicited code was used, promptly investigate resulting authorizations and sessions.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAIN5txpm30dqe[.]krointechbillpaycheckingusalexingto[.]sbsFunds-transfer variant destination reconstructed by the HTML/SVG redirector.
DOMAIN9l2v3vupv5[.]synerghylnksloads[.]cfdFirst-sample host used for the verification gate, counterfeit SharePoint page, and session endpoints.
DOMAINngjedt0xrv[.]promtateusachorloadscorp[.]sbsSecond-sample host serving the counterfeit document lure.
DOMAINtgg5rqrdcb[.]synerghylnksloads[.]cfdJoint-check variant destination reconstructed by the SVG redirector.
SHA25681f35c4a218032f44f4681e3f409ee7e024506bffc4446f7a9e7b3ce2d0ee932Hash of the HTML lure associated with the second sample.
SHA256bbf9f563371d6afc449c69546a4ec39e831ca18d3bf3764b7b4c27f525426140Hash of the first sample's HTML/SVG redirector.
SHA256d12b56f405af7fb5d80d828ccd5514e045eb9bfb3428bf77f20deca31ba5c0f7Hash of the second sample's SpwcinBillPaymentReports.zip attachment.
URLhxxps[:]//9l2v3vupv5[.]synerghylnksloads[.]cfd/l/CqCFCeikrUADecoded redirect destination for the first sample's phishing flow.
URLhxxps[:]//base-hub-yw7q[.]p-xxorevv8[.]workers[.]dev/l/taaeR_gygkoSpecific Cloudflare Workers URL used by a payment-advice attachment's click handler for hosted redirection.

MITRE ATT&CK

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