Hornetsecurity Details November Device-Code Phishing Campaigns Using Payment Lures

Summary
Hornetsecurity investigated November 2026 campaigns using payment-themed attachments, counterfeit SharePoint pages and Microsoft device authorization to trick Microsoft 365 users into granting access to attacker-controlled clients.
Key points
- Payment-themed emails used ZIP, HTML and SVG attachments to lead recipients to counterfeit document-sharing pages.
- One redirector recovered its destination through fragment reversal, substituted Base64 and repeating-key XOR; another rebuilt HTML from 475 obfuscated fragments.
- The fake workspaces supplied device codes and directed users to Microsoft's genuine authorization page, where successful authorization gave the attacker-controlled client tokens for granted permissions.
- Campaign pages used browser checks, session-status polling and heartbeat requests to coordinate the lure with backend activity.
- Hornetsecurity recommends inspecting archived HTML attachments, correlating campaign visits with device-code sign-ins, and investigating successful sign-ins without a business purpose.
- Organizations can restrict device-code flow with Conditional Access after testing the policy, and should investigate authorizations and sessions if a user completed an unsolicited flow.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Payment-themed phishing emails deliver ZIP or HTML attachments containing obfuscated HTML/SVG redirectors.
- Clicking a full-canvas SVG verification prompt runs JavaScript that reconstructs a destination URL and redirects the browser to a counterfeit SharePoint-style payment-document workspace.
- The counterfeit workspace supplies an attacker-initiated Microsoft device-authorization code and directs the recipient to enter it on Microsoft's genuine sign-in page; successful authorization provides tokens to the attacker-controlled requesting client.
- Campaign pages use browser and interaction checks to divert some visits, and session-status and heartbeat requests to coordinate the lure with its backend.
- Defensive Notes
- Inspect archives and HTML attachments rather than relying on filenames; investigate payment-themed attachments containing interactive SVGs or encoded document-sharing pages.
- Correlate visits to campaign hosts and session-specific status or heartbeat paths with device-code sign-ins, identity telemetry, accounts, applications, and timestamps.
- In Microsoft Entra sign-in logs, investigate successful Device code authentication without an expected business purpose, including the application, account, source, and timing.
- Audit legitimate device-code use and consider a Conditional Access policy that blocks Device code flow; test in report-only mode and retain carefully scoped exceptions.
- Tell users to enter a device code only for a sign-in or device setup they intentionally initiated and understand. If an unsolicited code was used, promptly investigate resulting authorizations and sessions.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | 5txpm30dqe[.]krointechbillpaycheckingusalexingto[.]sbs | Funds-transfer variant destination reconstructed by the HTML/SVG redirector. |
| DOMAIN | 9l2v3vupv5[.]synerghylnksloads[.]cfd | First-sample host used for the verification gate, counterfeit SharePoint page, and session endpoints. |
| DOMAIN | ngjedt0xrv[.]promtateusachorloadscorp[.]sbs | Second-sample host serving the counterfeit document lure. |
| DOMAIN | tgg5rqrdcb[.]synerghylnksloads[.]cfd | Joint-check variant destination reconstructed by the SVG redirector. |
| SHA256 | 81f35c4a218032f44f4681e3f409ee7e024506bffc4446f7a9e7b3ce2d0ee932 | Hash of the HTML lure associated with the second sample. |
| SHA256 | bbf9f563371d6afc449c69546a4ec39e831ca18d3bf3764b7b4c27f525426140 | Hash of the first sample's HTML/SVG redirector. |
| SHA256 | d12b56f405af7fb5d80d828ccd5514e045eb9bfb3428bf77f20deca31ba5c0f7 | Hash of the second sample's SpwcinBillPaymentReports.zip attachment. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//9l2v3vupv5[.]synerghylnksloads[.]cfd/l/CqCFCeikrUA | Decoded redirect destination for the first sample's phishing flow. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//base-hub-yw7q[.]p-xxorevv8[.]workers[.]dev/l/taaeR_gygko | Specific Cloudflare Workers URL used by a payment-advice attachment's click handler for hosted redirection. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationAttachment code concealed destinations or HTML using fragment manipulation, substituted Base64 alphabets, and XOR transformations.T1059.007 · JavaScriptJavaScript in the SVG/HTML attachments reconstructed destinations, redirected browsers, or inserted recovered HTML.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsThe phishing pages exchanged session-status and heartbeat requests with campaign endpoints over HTTP.T1204.002 · Malicious FileRecipients were prompted to open attachments and click an apparent verification control to trigger navigation.T1497.001 · System ChecksA campaign gate evaluated browser-window properties and mouse or touch interaction, redirecting some low-scoring visits to a benign destination.T1528 · Steal Application Access TokenSuccessful device-code authorization gave the attacker-controlled requesting client tokens for the granted permissions.T1566.001 · Spearphishing AttachmentPayment-themed phishing emails delivered ZIP or HTML attachments containing the redirector or lure.
Vendors
Products
Microsoft 365 Apps for EnterpriseIn November 2026, Hornetsecurity’s teams observed a resurgence of device-code phishing targeting Microsoft 365 accounts.Microsoft EntraIn Microsoft Entra sign-in logs, filter Authentication Protocol for Device code and investigate successful sign-ins that have no expected business purpose.Microsoft SharePointThe workflow combines familiar business documents, counterfeit SharePoint workspaces and Microsoft’s genuine sign-in page to persuade recipients to authorize access.
