Backdoored Cemu Linux Releases Linked to TeamPCP Supply-Chain Campaign

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Summary

Researchers found malicious Linux assets on Cemu’s official v2.6 GitHub release page, containing a payload also linked to compromised npm and PyPI packages. The malware harvests credentials and exfiltrates data; maintainers confirmed a co-author’s account or token was|?

Key points

  • A campaign poisoned 170 npm and PyPI packages within five hours, including TanStack and Mistral releases.
  • Two malicious Linux assets were uploaded to Cemu’s official v2.6 GitHub release page by a long-term co-author’s account; maintainers said the account or token was compromised.
  • The AppImage had nearly 19,900 downloads before discovery. Researchers found no related tag change, main-branch commits, workflow edits, or release deployment runs.
  • Both Linux packages contained a Python payload matching one distributed in the broader campaign; the Ubuntu version uses a marker-file gate that delays execution until a later run.
  • The Linux-only payload can persist as a systemd service and harvest cloud, Kubernetes, SSH, GitHub, and password-manager credentials.
  • The malware exfiltrates through a C2 server, a GitHub-commit dead drop, or a repository created under the victim’s account. Its destructive behavior is geofenced to Israel and Iran.
  • TeamPCP claimed responsibility, but researchers said they could not assess the claim’s credibility.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Compromised npm publishing tokens were used to publish malicious versions of legitimate packages, including @tanstack/react-router.
  • A backdoored mistralai==2.4.6 package was published to PyPI.
  • A compromised Cemu co-author account or token was used to replace Linux assets on the legitimate Cemu v2.6 GitHub release page.
  • The payload harvests credentials and secrets from AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, local filesystems, SSH keys, GitHub tokens, and password managers.
  • The payload exfiltrates results to a C2 IP, then attempts a GitHub-commit dead-drop resolver, and finally can create a public repository under the victim's account to upload results.
Defensive Notes
  • Check systems for the listed payload and release-asset SHA-256 indicators.
  • Investigate suspicious Linux Cemu v2.6 assets and activity from the compromised MangelSpec account or token.
  • Hunt for C2 traffic to 83[.]142.209[.]194 and for follow-on GitHub activity involving repositories created under victim accounts.
  • The article reports that the destructive rm -rf / command may not execute successfully on modern Linux systems without --no-preserve-root; a later variant used rm -rf /*.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV483[.]142[.]209[.]194C2 server used for the payload's primary exfiltration attempt.
SHA2560f35abda19fb69430c32228465396094b866d887427bf551e353ab31256a9dd6SHA-256 of the backdoored startup.pyz/transformers.pyz payload included in the Cemu AppImage.
SHA2561bf72f05191d849049d4a38fced2277ac5cfc54b7ae591f564e7a14add7c886dSHA-256 of the backdoored startup.pyz included in the Ubuntu Cemu archive.
SHA256d07a29c4458d00e42d5d9e6345932592e91644d6b821bacdb7a543c628e0b41aSHA-256 of the malicious Cemu-2.6-x86_64.AppImage release asset.
SHA256f140e76236b96adf7cdc796227af9808665143bc674debb77729fa3e4b8327ccSHA-256 of the malicious Cemu-2.6-ubuntu-22.04-x64.zip release asset.

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