Rapid7 Shows Five ONLYOFFICE Docs Flaws Can Escalate View-Only Access to Container Root

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Summary

Rapid7 demonstrated five ONLYOFFICE Docs vulnerabilities in 9.4.0-129, chaining view-only access to root command execution in the official container; a conditional WOPI route enabled unauthenticated entry. ONLYOFFICE says all five were fixed in Document Server 10.0.

Key points

  • Rapid7 demonstrated the flaws on ONLYOFFICE Document Server 9.4.0-129; the broader affected-version range is unknown.
  • CVE-2026-113627 lets a view-only token access DocBuilder file reads, including the Session JWT signing key, and supports forging credentials.
  • CVE-2026-110385 and CVE-2026-97727 enable attacker-controlled file extraction or path traversal writes that can lead to code execution as ds.
  • CVE-2026-113630 allows code running as ds to execute commands as root through an unsafe argument passed to a passwordless maintenance script.
  • CVE-2026-113631 lets a view-only user replace a reconnect callback and export a reconstructed DOCX containing data not shown in the viewer; the callback flaw also enables blind SSRF.
  • A conditional WOPI route can provide unauthenticated entry when WOPI is enabled and the attacker-controlled source is reachable and allowed by the IP filter.
  • ONLYOFFICE confirmed all five findings were fixed in Document Server 10.0; Rapid7 recommends upgrading to version 10.0 or later.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A view-only Editor JWT can be reused at /docbuilder because Browser and Inbox tokens share an effective signing key and the request does not require a DocBuilder-specific token. The accepted script can read files accessible to ds, including the Session JWT signing key in the tested configuration.
  • DocBuilder SaveFile conversion parameters are appended as raw XML. Duplicate task fields can override the source and destination paths and formats, letting an attacker extract an archive into a directory writable by ds and trigger execution through DocService's runtime logging configuration.
  • On filesystem-storage installations, a valid Session JWT can be used with a complete-save request whose format contains traversal segments to write files writable by ds.
  • The passwordless sudo policy lets ds run documentserver-flush-cache.sh with unrestricted arguments. The helper inserts the supplied hash into a sed expression without validation, enabling command execution as root.
  • A view-only session can reconnect with a replacement callback URL and invoke sendForm through RPC, causing DocumentServer to send a reconstructed DOCX to the replacement callback. The callback behavior also permits blind HTTP POST requests to reachable private or loopback destinations under the tested defaults.
  • With WOPI enabled, an attacker-controlled source that is reachable and allowed by the configured WOPI IP filter can provide metadata through the public launch endpoint. An empty access token and trailing-slash source URL can produce a Browser JWT accepted by /docbuilder, enabling the described chains without a pre-existing account or token.
Defensive Notes
  • Upgrade to Document Server 10.0 or later; ONLYOFFICE confirmed that version 10.0 fixes all five findings. Rapid7 tested package 10.0.0-169.
  • The tested 10.0.0-169 fixes add DocBuilder-specific JWT validation, restrict native file reads to paths in the font map, filter unsafe X2T conversion parameters, and reject storage paths that escape the storage root.
  • The tested 10.0.0-169 cache-flush helper validates the hash argument against an allowlist before inserting it into the sed expression.
  • The tested 10.0.0-169 changes require a non-view user for sendForm and restore the stored callback URL when a Session JWT reconnects.
  • The unauthenticated WOPI entry requires WOPI to be enabled and the attacker-controlled source to be reachable and permitted by the configured IP filter; WOPI is disabled by default.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1005 · Data from Local SystemGetFontBinary() was used through /docbuilder to read server-local files accessible to ds, including /etc/passwd and the Session JWT signing key configuration.T1059.004 · Unix ShellThe root-helper exploit used GNU sed's execution flag to run shell commands, including id, as root; the appender also invoked /bin/sh.T1059.007 · JavaScriptThe extracted JavaScript appender was loaded by DocService through log4js configuration and executed attacker-controlled code.T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege EscalationCommand injection through the maintenance helper elevated execution from ds to root inside the DocumentServer container.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe DocBuilder proof of concept submitted a base64-encoded ZIP containing an appender, command script, and runtime configuration, then extracted those files into the Data directory.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationThe article demonstrates exploitation of Document Server endpoints, including /docbuilder and the WOPI public launch path, to obtain unauthorized file access, code execution, and document export.T1548.003 · Sudo and Sudo CachingThe attacker abused the sudoers permission allowing ds to run documentserver-flush-cache.sh as root without a password.T1550.001 · Application Access TokenThe stolen signing key was used to forge a Session JWT with attacker-chosen document permissions, which Document Server accepted for a save operation.T1552.001 · Credentials In FilesIn the tested configuration, the attacker read local.json and recovered the Session JWT signing key stored in its session secret.

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