Huntress Details CVE-2026-84869 Exploitation of MSP ScreenConnect Technicians

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Summary

Huntress reports CVE-2026-84869 exploitation against MSP technicians, including a rogue ScreenConnect client deployed in one observed case. It found 688,000 guest file-run requests across 42 servers and advises patching technician clients and hunting for exposure.

Key points

  • Huntress observed a guest-pushed batch file execute on a technician's ScreenConnect host client without a prompt; the chain downloaded an MSI and launched a rogue ScreenConnect client.
  • The observed compromise unfolded in about nine seconds and connected the rogue client to masterdarky[.]com.
  • From October 20 to November 16, Huntress counted 688,000 guest “run file” requests across 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers, from 29 IP addresses.
  • Huntress linked the sprayed update_224ac089.bat file to the observed compromise and assessed with high confidence that the spray operator and masterdarky[.]com operator were the same.
  • Other observed activity included a marker-file canary test and attempts to use path traversal to place Sync.bat in a technician's Startup folder.
  • ConnectWise identified ScreenConnect host client and Access agent version 26.6.5 as fixed; Huntress recommends updating clients, removing the TransferFiles permission if patching is delayed, and hunting for suspicious guest file requests and workstation processes.
  • If exposure is found, Huntress advises isolating the workstation, removing the rogue client, and rotating credentials accessible from that technician's machine.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Attackers exploited CVE-2026-84869 by joining ScreenConnect sessions as guests and causing a technician's host client to run guest-pushed files without a prompt.
  • Guests repeatedly sprayed MSP ScreenConnect servers with requests to run update.bat or update_<8 hex>.bat files, waiting for a technician to join.
  • In observed activity, a batch file relaunched through PowerShell, reported the victim through a Telegram bot, downloaded an MSI, and launched a rogue ScreenConnect client connected to the attacker's relay.
  • An attacker sent a path-traversal filename intended to place Sync.bat in a technician's Windows Startup folder.
  • A guest pushed marker.txt as a canary to test whether the technician's client would run a guest-supplied file.
Defensive Notes
  • Update every technician's ScreenConnect host client and applicable Access agents to version 26.6.5 or later; updating the server alone does not fix the vulnerable technician-side code.
  • If patching is delayed, remove the TransferFiles permission from roles and session groups.
  • Review ScreenConnect session records for guest-originated RanFiles or SentFiles events, repeated update*.bat requests, marker.txt, Run-Lateral.bat, svc_payload.cmd, and paths containing ../; check whether a technician Host connection overlapped.
  • On technician workstations, investigate ScreenConnect clients spawning scripts from Temp folders, unexpected Startup-folder files, wclient_<8hex> folders, wupdate_<8hex>.msi files, and clients connecting to unrecognized relays.
  • If a workstation is exposed, isolate it, remove the rogue client and installer, restore the seclogon service's normal startup type, and rotate credentials accessible from the workstation.
  • Restrict guest session access and permissions, limit access to the ScreenConnect web interface and installer downloads where possible, and avoid joining unattended sessions that cannot be tied to a customer.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINmasterdarky[.]comAttacker-controlled domain used to host the payload and the rogue ScreenConnect relay.
IPV4103[.]195[.]100[.]70Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV4103[.]195[.]102[.]66Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV4107[.]148[.]223[.]103Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV4107[.]148[.]223[.]37Guest IP that pushed svc_payload.cmd repeatedly at a technician.
IPV4107[.]173[.]186[.]58Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV4154[.]30[.]4[.]248Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV4162[.]35[.]167[.]105Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV4162[.]35[.]40[.]249Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV4178[.]173[.]246[.]85Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV4181[.]215[.]242[.]106Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV4193[.]26[.]115[.]63Source IP for guest-pushed path-traversal attempts targeting a technician's Startup folder.
IPV4198[.]23[.]165[.]181Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV4199[.]127[.]60[.]149Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV4199[.]127[.]60[.]150Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV423[.]92[.]65[.]131Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV438[.]18[.]228[.]165Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV438[.]18[.]228[.]173Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV438[.]18[.]229[.]249Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV445[.]13[.]233[.]32Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV457[.]128[.]131[.]66Source IP for guest-pushed path-traversal attempts targeting a technician's Startup folder.
IPV464[.]20[.]44[.]120Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV466[.]118[.]239[.]23Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV474[.]235[.]98[.]176Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
IPV491[.]224[.]92[.]167Guest IP that pushed marker.txt as a canary to test file execution on technician workstations.
IPV491[.]224[.]92[.]83Guest IP that repeatedly pushed Run-Lateral.bat at a technician's ScreenConnect client.
IPV498[.]142[.]247[.]243Sprayer IP used by attacker guests to send repeated file-run requests to MSP ScreenConnect servers.
SHA256f8871b1561d5c77c297378a7f49c84de52a01ff297395544f0e95d13ef972841SHA-256 hash identified for WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe, the rogue ScreenConnect client.
URLhxxps[:]//masterdarky[.]com/WindowsUpdate.msiSpecific attacker-hosted URL for the MSI containing the rebranded ScreenConnect client.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1012 · Query RegistryThe batch file used reg query to retrieve the Windows product name and build.T1036.005 · Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationThe rogue ScreenConnect client was named WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe and the installer was named wupdate_<id>.msi.T1059.001 · PowerShellThe batch script relaunched itself through PowerShell, which also launched the payload.T1059.003 · Windows Command ShellGuest-pushed batch and command files included update_<8 hex>.bat, Sync.bat, Run-Lateral.bat, and svc_payload.cmd.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryThe observed script collected the Windows product name and build.T1102.003 · One-Way CommunicationThe script decoded a Telegram bot token and chat ID and used the bot to report a new victim to the operator.T1105 · Ingress Tool Transfercurl downloaded the stage-two MSI to the technician's Temp directory; attacker guests also pushed files through ScreenConnect sessions.T1134.002 · Create Process with TokenThe observed chain used runas /trustlevel:0x20000 to launch the payload under a different trust level.T1203 · Exploitation for Client ExecutionThe article reports that CVE-2026-84869 let a guest cause the technician's ScreenConnect host client to run pushed files such as update_224ac089.bat and marker.txt without a prompt.T1218.007 · Msiexecmsiexec /a unpacked the downloaded MSI into a local wclient_<id> directory as an administrative image.T1219.002 · Remote Desktop SoftwareA rebranded ScreenConnect client was launched on the technician's workstation and connected to the attacker's relay.T1543.003 · Windows ServiceThe observed commands changed the seclogon service to start automatically and then started it.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderA path-traversal filename was pushed to place Sync.bat in a technician's Windows Startup folder for execution at the next logon.T1564.003 · Hidden WindowThe batch script relaunched itself hidden using PowerShell and WScript.Shell.T1571 · Non-Standard PortThe rogue ScreenConnect client connected to the attacker's relay on port 8041.

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