RunningRAT Analysis Finds Crypto-Mining Tools on Associated C2 Server

· Original article ↗

Summary

Researchers analyzed RunningRAT samples and infrastructure, finding XMRig deployment scripts and tools on an associated C2 server. The RAT communicates with the server, while a separate executable showed possible credential-stealing functionality.

Key points

  • An open directory hosted a RunningRAT sample, which drops files and loads a DLL to perform data collection, C2 communication, and persistence.
  • The sample communicated with 24.199.123[.]1 over TCP port 4000; packet data included a hardware-related string that may indicate system profiling.
  • An open directory on the associated server contained scripts that remove competing miners, download XMRig, and use NSSM to register the miner as a service.
  • No cryptocurrency wallet addresses were found in the analyzed XMRig-related files.
  • A separate executable, kill.exe, appeared designed to search files and browsers for stored credentials, but testing observed limited data transmission.
  • The article provides IP addresses, domains, file hashes, and ports as threat-intelligence indicators.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • RunningRAT was hosted in an accessible open directory and executed from me.exe.
  • RunningRAT dropped files into the System32 directory, launched a custom service-group process, and loaded its DLL payload.
  • RunningRAT communicated with a C2 server over TCP port 4000.
  • Batch scripts used CMD and PowerShell commands to remove competing coinminers, download and install XMRig, and register it as a service using NSSM.
  • kill.exe scanned the compromised device for stored credentials and browser data, then attempted to communicate with the C2 server over TCP port 5000.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINapi[.]ipify[.]orgEndpoint kill.exe contacts to retrieve the compromised host's public IP address; the article does not identify it as attacker-controlled infrastructure.
DOMAINhost404111[.]xyzDomain associated with the RunningRAT C2 server.
IPV4139[.]162[.]102[.]163IP hosting the open directory containing a RunningRAT sample.
IPV424[.]199[.]123[.]1RunningRAT C2 server and host of the open directory containing cryptocurrency-mining files.
SHA25611bd2c9f9e2397c9a16e0990e4ed2cf0679498fe0fd418a3dfdac60b5c160ee5SHA-256 of WinRing0x64.sys included with the XMRig files.
SHA256152f1bf6b11eb2f8e0f31bce6853f7f9fa604164a429741ec0973f508f6520e1SHA-256 of the 240634687.dll payload dropped by me.exe.
SHA256175d861d8f1337df6a0aafb845c2b7967d0c1ecd8c230e345d75d557440f15e5SHA-256 of xmr-unban.bat, a script used to install XMRig.
SHA25627a823c06e68b5f32c2331ef89de4f1de1773f39449a3509b3f397c3c4376cadSHA-256 of xmrig.zip, downloaded by the mining scripts.
SHA25654409f5edb22b2c84de1ff5e6a76dd4b34d5acde60a0777f16251ccf4849929fSHA-256 of the XMRig configuration file config.json.
SHA2566cbe0e1f046b13b29bfa26f8b368281d2dda7eb9b718651d5856f22cc3e02910SHA-256 of NETSYSDDL.exe dropped by me.exe.
SHA256b10884a495070c2f9ee183bbbb6d1b8f7351fc75d094f4bb212c38c859a6e867SHA-256 of the RunningRAT sample me.exe.
SHA256b69bf007797fdfecc90c5511dde776dc6c18c48cddec2804753533dbee4af80dSHA-256 of the xmrig.exe miner included in the archive.
SHA256c55a1c1e2d0623fd7c5b2224e2e5a7b6f053f997080fb4f3d37a37d1b9ce807aSHA-256 of kill.exe, described as a spyware tool for scanning stored credentials.
SHA256db312628b3001d24ca2836ab065bed9573f65158a3b31d97f009f44110c4a4cbSHA-256 of the ini.ini configuration file dropped by me.exe.
SHA256e8d595834bb500f0bb3ad688fe7307e3a182229f3ef16a16549c9797cf1d8985SHA-256 of xmr-normal.bat, a script used to install XMRig.

MITRE ATT&CK

Malware

Products

Tools

Countries

Related Articles