Check Point Gateways Targeted in PHP2Shell Campaign With TSGA Backdoor and Wiper

· Original article ↗

Summary

Check Point Research details October–November 2026 exploitation of vulnerable Check Point gateways via PHP2Shell and CVE-2026-123039, followed by TSGA/TSProxy persistence and ESXi wiper deployment. Tooling links to PhiliKit, but attribution remains uncertain.

Key points

  • The first exploitation wave began October 30, 2026, targeting Israeli organizations; some experienced destructive activity. A second wave on November 2 reached organizations in multiple countries, with no evidence of destruction.
  • Attackers used PHP2Shell against Check Point Mobile Access portals, then escalated privileges through the DynamicCLI interface using CVE-2026-123039.
  • After gaining root access, attackers deployed PHP webshells and the persistent TSGA backdoor, which embeds TSProxy for concealed networking access.
  • The attackers used the gogo scanner to find internal assets, pivoted over SSH to a VMware ESXi host, and deployed the destroy_v6 wiper with DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes.
  • TSGA and TSProxy share code and cryptographic material with PhiliKit-associated tooling, supporting a shared lineage.
  • Although PhiliKit has been associated with China-nexus UNC5221, the researchers say evidence is insufficient to confidently attribute the operation; several actor and false-flag scenarios remain plausible.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Attackers exploited PHP2Shell through vulnerable Check Point Mobile Access portals for initial access, with activity associated with CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619.
  • After gaining access, attackers exploited CVE-2026-123039 in the DynamicCLI IPC interface to escalate privileges to root.
  • Attackers deployed PHP webshells in the Mobile Access portal templates directory and used them for command execution and file uploads.
  • Attackers deployed the TSGA backdoor and its embedded TSProxy component on compromised gateways, then used SSH to move laterally to a VMware ESXi host.
  • Attackers deployed the destroy_v6 wiper on the ESXi host, deleting files and leaving DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes.
Defensive Notes
  • Keep Check Point Security Gateways patched; the reported activity targeted unpatched gateways after a security fix had become available.
  • Investigate Mobile Access gateways for PHP session files containing the upload_progress_pwn marker, repeated Apache/PHP worker segmentation faults, and unexpected .tpl files matching zz*.tpl.
  • Hunt for the reported persistence and payload artifacts, including /tmp/CPconfigdaemon, slot_CPconfigdaemon, /lib/libcpfwcommon.so, /tmp/.up.tpl, and challenge_render.tpl.
  • Review gateway and ESXi systems for unexpected scanning activity and SSH access using the vpxuser service account, and investigate signs of destructive file deletion.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4130[.]94[.]19[.]168IP listed among attacker infrastructure indicators; the article describes the campaign infrastructure as hosted on LightNode VPS infrastructure.
IPV4130[.]94[.]19[.]204Attacker-originating IP reported in connection with exploitation attempts against Israeli organizations.
SHA2560522937c0c0337be54fe25493539e5f5f8ceb9742c980aaff1cfc9515f3a96f7SHA-256 of DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt, the note left during the destructive activity.
SHA2563b51080a909023f7d484e2443740b572307ce0054eb9e32d98f0a06bfcd2db90SHA-256 of the gogo scanner deployed on the gateway to discover internal assets and services.
SHA2564171b521fa6441382aa2fa014a08e18ff9a6e0ab6096c9144072bf46b37a2ec8SHA-256 of slot_CPconfigdaemon, the deployed TSGA implant.
SHA256c7d9477309fac6c638a1128442056a242de086996add8cb49cd6496c36003237SHA-256 listed for destory_v6, the wiper referred to elsewhere in the article as destroy_v6.
SHA256d7549671c7189979f0624ec52dad9ea6a707d23146e3585ab8f8c4720eca0c63SHA-256 of CPconfigdaemon, identified in the IOC table as an attacker-deployed artifact.
SHA256edb3e92eb7bda7413a09edcc4b1ba3cbed4bcdf42808a8abce63b6e4c3fda2b3SHA-256 of a PHP webshell artifact listed in the article's IOC table.
SHA256ee16e1695711b9d60c62925fcfb2fe1a29c18ae26565bc05410a14e16d2a39d7SHA-256 of the philistine sample referenced in the article's discussion of the PhiliKit toolset.
SHA256fb1a6235eb6bce8c9ec8cd8bb85f17c9c2bde8ecb45b7a243a30ceadf26654daSHA-256 of libdssafe.so, a networking component embedded in the PhiliKit package and compared with TSProxy.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1021.004 · SSHAttackers moved from the gateway to a VMware ESXi host over SSH, authenticating with the vpxuser service account.T1046 · Network Service DiscoveryThe attackers used the gogo scanner on the gateway to discover internal assets and services.T1055 · Process InjectionTSProxy injection code loads its shared library into selected appliance processes to intercept networking functions.T1059.004 · Unix ShellThe webshells supported operating-system command execution, and the attackers issued commands to stage files and launch the TSGA implant.T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege EscalationAttackers exploited CVE-2026-123039 in the DynamicCLI IPC interface to escalate from the portal service account to root.T1090 · ProxyThe embedded TSProxy component supports encrypted SOCKS-style proxying.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferAttackers used webshell file-upload functionality to stage files, including copying an uploaded file into the portal directory, and deployed additional implants and the wiper.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationAttackers exploited PHP2Shell through vulnerable Check Point Mobile Access portals for initial access.T1485 · Data DestructionThe destroy_v6 wiper recursively deleted files on the ESXi host and attempted to overwrite them with zeros before deletion.T1505.003 · Web ShellAttackers placed PHP webshells in the Mobile Access portal templates directory and used them to execute commands and upload files.T1573 · Encrypted ChannelThe article describes TSGA communications as authenticated and encrypted, including communications over TCP port 11072 and a Unix socket.

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