Check Point Gateways Targeted in PHP2Shell Campaign With TSGA Backdoor and Wiper

Summary
Check Point Research details October–November 2026 exploitation of vulnerable Check Point gateways via PHP2Shell and CVE-2026-123039, followed by TSGA/TSProxy persistence and ESXi wiper deployment. Tooling links to PhiliKit, but attribution remains uncertain.
Key points
- The first exploitation wave began October 30, 2026, targeting Israeli organizations; some experienced destructive activity. A second wave on November 2 reached organizations in multiple countries, with no evidence of destruction.
- Attackers used PHP2Shell against Check Point Mobile Access portals, then escalated privileges through the DynamicCLI interface using CVE-2026-123039.
- After gaining root access, attackers deployed PHP webshells and the persistent TSGA backdoor, which embeds TSProxy for concealed networking access.
- The attackers used the gogo scanner to find internal assets, pivoted over SSH to a VMware ESXi host, and deployed the destroy_v6 wiper with DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes.
- TSGA and TSProxy share code and cryptographic material with PhiliKit-associated tooling, supporting a shared lineage.
- Although PhiliKit has been associated with China-nexus UNC5221, the researchers say evidence is insufficient to confidently attribute the operation; several actor and false-flag scenarios remain plausible.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Attackers exploited PHP2Shell through vulnerable Check Point Mobile Access portals for initial access, with activity associated with CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619.
- After gaining access, attackers exploited CVE-2026-123039 in the DynamicCLI IPC interface to escalate privileges to root.
- Attackers deployed PHP webshells in the Mobile Access portal templates directory and used them for command execution and file uploads.
- Attackers deployed the TSGA backdoor and its embedded TSProxy component on compromised gateways, then used SSH to move laterally to a VMware ESXi host.
- Attackers deployed the destroy_v6 wiper on the ESXi host, deleting files and leaving DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes.
- Defensive Notes
- Keep Check Point Security Gateways patched; the reported activity targeted unpatched gateways after a security fix had become available.
- Investigate Mobile Access gateways for PHP session files containing the upload_progress_pwn marker, repeated Apache/PHP worker segmentation faults, and unexpected .tpl files matching zz*.tpl.
- Hunt for the reported persistence and payload artifacts, including /tmp/CPconfigdaemon, slot_CPconfigdaemon, /lib/libcpfwcommon.so, /tmp/.up.tpl, and challenge_render.tpl.
- Review gateway and ESXi systems for unexpected scanning activity and SSH access using the vpxuser service account, and investigate signs of destructive file deletion.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IPV4 | 130[.]94[.]19[.]168 | IP listed among attacker infrastructure indicators; the article describes the campaign infrastructure as hosted on LightNode VPS infrastructure. |
| IPV4 | 130[.]94[.]19[.]204 | Attacker-originating IP reported in connection with exploitation attempts against Israeli organizations. |
| SHA256 | 0522937c0c0337be54fe25493539e5f5f8ceb9742c980aaff1cfc9515f3a96f7 | SHA-256 of DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt, the note left during the destructive activity. |
| SHA256 | 3b51080a909023f7d484e2443740b572307ce0054eb9e32d98f0a06bfcd2db90 | SHA-256 of the gogo scanner deployed on the gateway to discover internal assets and services. |
| SHA256 | 4171b521fa6441382aa2fa014a08e18ff9a6e0ab6096c9144072bf46b37a2ec8 | SHA-256 of slot_CPconfigdaemon, the deployed TSGA implant. |
| SHA256 | c7d9477309fac6c638a1128442056a242de086996add8cb49cd6496c36003237 | SHA-256 listed for destory_v6, the wiper referred to elsewhere in the article as destroy_v6. |
| SHA256 | d7549671c7189979f0624ec52dad9ea6a707d23146e3585ab8f8c4720eca0c63 | SHA-256 of CPconfigdaemon, identified in the IOC table as an attacker-deployed artifact. |
| SHA256 | edb3e92eb7bda7413a09edcc4b1ba3cbed4bcdf42808a8abce63b6e4c3fda2b3 | SHA-256 of a PHP webshell artifact listed in the article's IOC table. |
| SHA256 | ee16e1695711b9d60c62925fcfb2fe1a29c18ae26565bc05410a14e16d2a39d7 | SHA-256 of the philistine sample referenced in the article's discussion of the PhiliKit toolset. |
| SHA256 | fb1a6235eb6bce8c9ec8cd8bb85f17c9c2bde8ecb45b7a243a30ceadf26654da | SHA-256 of libdssafe.so, a networking component embedded in the PhiliKit package and compared with TSProxy. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1021.004 · SSHAttackers moved from the gateway to a VMware ESXi host over SSH, authenticating with the vpxuser service account.T1046 · Network Service DiscoveryThe attackers used the gogo scanner on the gateway to discover internal assets and services.T1055 · Process InjectionTSProxy injection code loads its shared library into selected appliance processes to intercept networking functions.T1059.004 · Unix ShellThe webshells supported operating-system command execution, and the attackers issued commands to stage files and launch the TSGA implant.T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege EscalationAttackers exploited CVE-2026-123039 in the DynamicCLI IPC interface to escalate from the portal service account to root.T1090 · ProxyThe embedded TSProxy component supports encrypted SOCKS-style proxying.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferAttackers used webshell file-upload functionality to stage files, including copying an uploaded file into the portal directory, and deployed additional implants and the wiper.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationAttackers exploited PHP2Shell through vulnerable Check Point Mobile Access portals for initial access.T1485 · Data DestructionThe destroy_v6 wiper recursively deleted files on the ESXi host and attempted to overwrite them with zeros before deletion.T1505.003 · Web ShellAttackers placed PHP webshells in the Mobile Access portal templates directory and used them to execute commands and upload files.T1573 · Encrypted ChannelThe article describes TSGA communications as authenticated and encrypted, including communications over TCP port 11072 and a Unix socket.
CVE
CVE-2026-109618PHP Group · PHP; Siemens · AMIS TS; +105 moreEvidence suggested some cases of a successful compromise, with exploitation activity consistent with PHP2Shell, associated with CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619.CVE-2026-109619PHP Group · PHP; Siemens · AMIS TS; +106 moreEvidence suggested some cases of a successful compromise, with exploitation activity consistent with PHP2Shell, associated with CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619.CVE-2026-123039checkpoint · Quantum Security Gateway; checkpoint · Quantum Security ManagementPoint Security Gateways, using Mobile Access portals with PHP2Shell as initial access followed by CVE-2026-123039.
Threat Actors
Malware
destroy_v6The attackers pivoted from the gateway to a VMware ESXi host over SSH, deployed the destroy_v6 wiper, and left politically themed DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes during the destructive stage.PhiliKitTSGA and TSProxy are modified variants of PhiliKit, a malware framework previously documented in attacks exploiting Ivanti vulnerabilities.TSGAThe attackers then deployed PHP webshells, the persistent TSGA backdoor and its embedded TSProxy networking component.TSProxyThe attackers then deployed PHP webshells, the persistent TSGA backdoor and its embedded TSProxy networking component.
Vendors
Products
Check Point Security Gatewaysan attacker executed scanning and exploitation activity against organizations with unpatched Check Point Security Gateways, using Mobile Access portals with PHP2Shell as initial access followed by CVE-2026-123039.ESXiThe attackers pivoted from the gateway to a VMware ESXi host over SSH, deployed the destroy_v6 wiper, and left politically themed DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes during the destructive stage.Mobile Accessand exploitation activity against organizations with unpatched Check Point Security Gateways, using Mobile Access portals with PHP2Shell as initial access followed by CVE-2026-123039.
Tools
Countries
ChinaAlthough ESET associated PhiliKit with China nexus UNC5221, the evidence does not allow us to assess with high confidence the true nature of this operation.IsraelA second scanning wave on November 2nd targeted some Israeli organizations previously targeted during the first wave, alongside additional organizations worldwide, with no apparent focus on Israel.
