Wfx-loot campaign used 4,837 compromised GitHub accounts to steal cloud credentials

Summary
Aikido researchers say wfx-loot used credentials from 4,837 compromised GitHub accounts to probe 61,764 repositories and steal secrets from at least 1,835 targets through malicious GitHub Actions workflows.
Key points
- Aikido says the campaign began on November 10, 2026, and used compromised accounts to probe repositories for write access through disguised pull requests.
- Researchers report that the actor modified or added GitHub Actions workflows, or planted an npm install hook, to deliver a credential-stealing script.
- The script targeted GitHub Actions tokens, cloud credentials, developer and infrastructure secrets, AI service credentials, and secrets in files and runtime data.
- The script could exchange GitHub OIDC tokens for temporary AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud sessions; AWS role chaining and GCP identity impersonation could support further access where permissions allowed.
- The actor compressed collected data into tarballs and exfiltrated it through HTTP POST, then reverted changes and deleted workflow runs and logs; Aikido says cleanup took under a minute.
- Automated publishing carried payloads into Packagist’s digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.3 and Go module github[.]com/onuragtas/docker-env versions v1.0.278 and v1.0.280.
- Aikido advises repository owners to check for the wfx-docs branch, probe pull requests, and gaps in workflow run numbers; where execution is confirmed, available secrets and cloud roles should be treated as compromised and rotated.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- The attacker used stolen credentials from 4,837 compromised GitHub accounts to probe repositories and open pull requests where those accounts had write access.
- Malicious code was introduced by modifying existing GitHub Actions workflows, adding workflows on short-lived branches, or planting an npm install hook.
- A shell script collected GitHub Actions secrets, cloud credentials, developer credentials, and other secrets, including from environment variables, files, private keys, shell histories, process memory, and workflow artifacts.
- The script exchanged GitHub OIDC tokens for temporary cloud sessions, chained into AWS IAM roles, and used collected service-account credentials to impersonate identities in GCP.
- Collected data was compressed into tarballs and exfiltrated via HTTP POST to attacker-controlled endpoints.
- The attacker reverted changes and deleted workflow runs and logs after payload execution.
- Defensive Notes
- Repository owners should look for the ‘wfx-docs’ branch, the probe pull request, and gaps in workflow run numbers.
- Where payload execution is confirmed, treat all secrets and cloud roles available to affected workflows as compromised and rotate them immediately.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1048.003 · Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolThe script exfiltrated compressed collected data using HTTP POST to attacker-controlled endpoints.T1059.004 · Unix ShellThe credential-stealing payload was a shell script.T1078 · Valid AccountsThe attacker used stolen GitHub credentials from compromised accounts to access repositories and probe for write permissions.T1098.001 · Additional Cloud CredentialsThe article says the script could create long-lived credentials for IAM users using roles available in a repository.T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainAutomated publishing carried the payload into releases of Packagist’s digitalelvis/neuronai-studio and the github.com/onuragtas/docker-env Go module.T1528 · Steal Application Access TokenThe script collected GitHub Actions, OIDC, and Actions runtime tokens.T1552.001 · Credentials In FilesThe script searched for credentials in environment variables, .env files, repository files, and other files.T1552.003 · Shell HistoryThe script collected secrets from shell histories.T1552.004 · Private KeysThe script collected private keys.T1552.005 · Cloud Instance Metadata APIThe script sought cloud credentials exposed through instance metadata on self-hosted runners.
Products
AWSCloud credentials for AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud, including credentials exposed through instance metadata on self-hosted runners.AzureCloud credentials for AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud, including credentials exposed through instance metadata on self-hosted runners.GitHubHackers compromise 4,800 GitHub accounts to steal cloud credentialsGitHub ActionsTens of thousands of GitHub repositories were targeted in a campaign dubbed ‘wfx-loot’ that uses malicious workflows to steal GitHub Actions secrets and cloud credentials.Google CloudCloud credentials for AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud, including credentials exposed through instance metadata on self-hosted runners.
