Luna Moth Uses Stolen Microsoft 365 Tokens to Re-Target Law Firms

Summary
ReliaQuest says Luna Moth is re-targeting law firms by tricking users into sharing Microsoft 365 Copilot Graph tokens, then replaying them to bulk-download files. Issued tokens can bypass subsequent Conditional Access checks; the report recommends CAE and strict
Key points
- ReliaQuest reports that Luna Moth, also known as Silent Ransom Group, has targeted law firms since at least mid-2023 and apparently revisited some prior extortion victims in October and November; leak-site listings suggest those firms may not have paid.
- In the reported technique, callers posing as IT support persuade users on video calls to retrieve a Microsoft Graph access token from Microsoft 365 Copilot and share it with the attacker.
- Attackers replay the token from their own infrastructure to download files in bulk through Microsoft Graph; the report says observed intrusions involved thousands of files and a first download about a minute after token copying.
- The tokens are issued on users’ compliant devices and satisfy MFA and Conditional Access at sign-in. Conditional Access does not re-check them on every use, so the attacker may not generate a sign-in event.
- Compared with earlier activity involving remote-management tools and manual exfiltration, token replay shifts file theft from the endpoint to cloud access and can make the activity resemble the legitimate user’s actions.
- ReliaQuest recommends Continuous Access Evaluation with strict location enforcement, rapid session revocation, correlating video-call and Microsoft 365 telemetry, and restricting developer tools and unapproved remote-support tools.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Luna Moth callers impersonate IT support and persuade employees to join a video call and share their screen.
- The attacker directs the employee to copy a Microsoft Graph access token from Microsoft 365 Copilot and paste it into a text-sharing site.
- The attacker retrieves and replays the token from their own infrastructure to bulk-download files through the Microsoft Graph API.
- In follow-on activity, the group reportedly sent a blank-subject email with a deliberately broken PDF, then called the target about the supposed malicious email.
- Earlier intrusions used remote-management or Windows remote-assistance tools and manual data exfiltration.
- Defensive Notes
- Enable Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) with strict location enforcement, and define all legitimate egress IP ranges as named locations.
- Restrict browser developer tools and token-inspection pages on managed browsers.
- Restrict remote-support and screen-sharing tools to approved software, platforms, and participants.
- Train users not to share tokens or follow unsolicited IT instructions, and to verify requests using a known help-desk number.
- Correlate video-call, email, proxy or DNS, and Microsoft 365 audit telemetry; investigate Graph file access from unfamiliar addresses.
- Revoke compromised sessions promptly and monitor for unusual bulk downloads.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | justsendtext[.]xyz | Text-sharing site used to pass the stolen access token to the attacker. |
| IPV4 | 104[.]37[.]184[.]195 | IP address used for token replay and bulk file downloads, according to the article. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1020 · Automated ExfiltrationThe article describes automated bulk downloading of thousands of files after the token is replayed.T1213.002 · SharepointThe stolen token is used to access and download SharePoint files through Microsoft Graph.T1528 · Steal Application Access TokenThe attacker persuades an employee to extract and share a Microsoft Graph access token from Microsoft 365 Copilot.T1550.001 · Application Access TokenThe attacker replays the stolen access token from their own infrastructure to access files through Microsoft Graph.T1566.004 · Spearphishing VoiceThe attacker uses a phone call, sometimes from a spoofed number, to pose as IT support and direct the victim.T1656 · ImpersonationThe caller impersonates IT support to persuade employees to share their screen and hand over an access token.
Threat Actors
Vendors
Products
Conditional AccessThe stolen token passes Conditional Access (which approves sign-ins) because its device check runs only at sign-in, not when the token is later used.Continuous Access EvaluationOrganizations should implement Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) with strict location enforcement so a stolen token stops working outside the victim’s network.Microsoft 365 Copilot(the credential that applications use to read Microsoft 365 data, such as SharePoint files) from Microsoft 365 Copilot. The group then uses that token from its own infrastructure to download files in bulk.Microsoft GraphNow, the attacker still calls a target posing as IT support but persuades them to extract a Microsoft Graph access token (the credential that applications use to read Microsoft 365 data, such as SharePointMicrosoft SharePointMicrosoft Graph access token (the credential that applications use to read Microsoft 365 data, such as SharePoint files) from Microsoft 365 Copilot. The group then uses that token from its own infrastructure toWindows remote-assistance toolIT support, who talked employees into joining a video call and then had them open a built-in Windows remote-assistance tool to hand over control of their machines. They manually exfiltrated sensitive data to personal
