Luna Moth Uses Stolen Microsoft 365 Tokens to Re-Target Law Firms

· Original article ↗

Summary

ReliaQuest says Luna Moth is re-targeting law firms by tricking users into sharing Microsoft 365 Copilot Graph tokens, then replaying them to bulk-download files. Issued tokens can bypass subsequent Conditional Access checks; the report recommends CAE and strict

Key points

  • ReliaQuest reports that Luna Moth, also known as Silent Ransom Group, has targeted law firms since at least mid-2023 and apparently revisited some prior extortion victims in October and November; leak-site listings suggest those firms may not have paid.
  • In the reported technique, callers posing as IT support persuade users on video calls to retrieve a Microsoft Graph access token from Microsoft 365 Copilot and share it with the attacker.
  • Attackers replay the token from their own infrastructure to download files in bulk through Microsoft Graph; the report says observed intrusions involved thousands of files and a first download about a minute after token copying.
  • The tokens are issued on users’ compliant devices and satisfy MFA and Conditional Access at sign-in. Conditional Access does not re-check them on every use, so the attacker may not generate a sign-in event.
  • Compared with earlier activity involving remote-management tools and manual exfiltration, token replay shifts file theft from the endpoint to cloud access and can make the activity resemble the legitimate user’s actions.
  • ReliaQuest recommends Continuous Access Evaluation with strict location enforcement, rapid session revocation, correlating video-call and Microsoft 365 telemetry, and restricting developer tools and unapproved remote-support tools.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Luna Moth callers impersonate IT support and persuade employees to join a video call and share their screen.
  • The attacker directs the employee to copy a Microsoft Graph access token from Microsoft 365 Copilot and paste it into a text-sharing site.
  • The attacker retrieves and replays the token from their own infrastructure to bulk-download files through the Microsoft Graph API.
  • In follow-on activity, the group reportedly sent a blank-subject email with a deliberately broken PDF, then called the target about the supposed malicious email.
  • Earlier intrusions used remote-management or Windows remote-assistance tools and manual data exfiltration.
Defensive Notes
  • Enable Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) with strict location enforcement, and define all legitimate egress IP ranges as named locations.
  • Restrict browser developer tools and token-inspection pages on managed browsers.
  • Restrict remote-support and screen-sharing tools to approved software, platforms, and participants.
  • Train users not to share tokens or follow unsolicited IT instructions, and to verify requests using a known help-desk number.
  • Correlate video-call, email, proxy or DNS, and Microsoft 365 audit telemetry; investigate Graph file access from unfamiliar addresses.
  • Revoke compromised sessions promptly and monitor for unusual bulk downloads.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINjustsendtext[.]xyzText-sharing site used to pass the stolen access token to the attacker.
IPV4104[.]37[.]184[.]195IP address used for token replay and bulk file downloads, according to the article.

MITRE ATT&CK

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