ASEC Details Wpcdoor Attacks Spread Through Korean DVR Management Software

Summary
ASEC details Wpcdoor infections linked to Korean DVR management software, tracing a DLL side-loading chain and backdoor capabilities including credential, browser, file and cryptocurrency-wallet data theft. The initial access method remains unclear.
Key points
- ASEC observed malware associated with Korean DVR management software; it remains unclear whether delivery involved a vulnerability, misconfiguration or built-in feature.
- The reported chain uses DLL side-loading: IPHLPAPI.DLL leads to WpcMon.exe and samcli.dll, which downloads and runs Wpcdoor in memory.
- The downloaders use WPCF-marked requests and XOR decryption with key 0x82615458.
- Wpcdoor can collect system information and screenshots, log keystrokes, access clipboard data, steal files and browser data, and execute commands.
- Its commands also include searching wallet-related process memory for suspected seed phrases, port forwarding and remote control through HVNC.
- ASEC classifies the actor as Larva-26013 and says it has observed the actor installing Wpcdoor in cases outside Korea.
- ASEC recommends updating supported software and operating systems, checking the software's security settings, and changing credentials used with the software and related systems.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Malware was distributed through DVR management software developed by an unnamed Korean company. The report says it is unclear whether this involved a vulnerability, improper configuration, or a built-in feature.
- The malware was loaded into rs.win32.exe and WpcMon.exe through DLL side-loading.
- A downloader retrieved WpcMon.exe and samcli.dll; samcli.dll then downloaded and executed Wpcdoor in memory.
- Defensive Notes
- Apply the latest security patches for supported software and operating systems.
- Review the security settings of the affected software.
- Change usernames and passwords used in the affected software and related systems.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IPV4 | 144[.]172[.]116[.]37 | IP address listed among indicators for the malware cases. |
| IPV4 | 172[.]86[.]127[.]14 | HVNC endpoint specified for a Wpcdoor command. |
| IPV4 | 172[.]86[.]127[.]89 | IP address listed among indicators for the malware cases. |
| MD5 | 0a9cb414b53536ad8fc217fc46a2cf56 | MD5 hash listed in the article's indicators for the malware cases. |
| MD5 | 14746a3aa1d1882a53d244b39e6895b3 | MD5 hash listed in the article's indicators for the malware cases. |
| MD5 | 2376baa1ba3a918f754db6bbc15cb1d7 | MD5 hash listed in the article's indicators for the malware cases. |
| MD5 | 6bafd9065f68ecd5778b8c828bb17134 | MD5 hash listed in the article's indicators for the malware cases. |
| MD5 | 7e42d1461339572111a2eedfff42e1c2 | MD5 hash listed in the article's indicators for the malware cases. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1005 · Data from Local SystemWpcdoor searched user folders and collected files, and could dump memory from specified processes.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelWpcdoor transmitted stolen system, browser, clipboard, and other collected data to its C&C server.T1056.001 · KeyloggingWpcdoor transmitted keylogging data to its C&C server.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryWpcdoor collected the infected system's OS version.T1083 · File and Directory DiscoveryWpcdoor searched user folders for filenames supplied by the C&C server.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe downloader retrieved WpcMon.exe and samcli.dll, and samcli.dll downloaded Wpcdoor from the C&C server.T1113 · Screen CaptureWpcdoor captured screenshots, including transmitting them at regular intervals.T1115 · Clipboard DataWpcdoor collected clipboard data and could modify the clipboard.T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDownloaded payloads were decrypted using XOR with key 0x82615458 before use.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderWpcdoor registered itself under the Run key with the name WpcMon.T1555.003 · Credentials from Web BrowsersWpcdoor stole browser-stored credentials and other browser data, including cookies and credit card numbers.T1574.002 · DLL Side-LoadingIPHLPAPI.DLL was loaded into rs.win32.exe via DLL side-loading; samcli.dll was likewise loaded by WpcMon.exe.
