1Phish Kit Evolves to Capture 1Password MFA and Recovery Codes

Summary
Datadog researchers traced 1Phish through four versions (September 2025–February 2026), documenting its shift to an API-driven kit that fingerprints victims and captures 1Password credentials, OTPs, and recovery codes. No reverse-proxy infrastructure was observed.
Key points
- Captured DOM snapshots show four versions evolving from basic credential pages into a multi-stage, REST API-driven phishing kit.
- The kit captures 1Password emails, secret keys, and passwords; later versions add OTP capture, and V4 also collects 1PRK recovery codes and targets enterprise sign-ins.
- Browser and device fingerprinting, bot scoring, automation checks, and HideClick cloaking help filter visitors and hinder automated analysis.
- Shared frontend artifacts, workflow endpoints, fingerprinting logic, and infrastructure reuse link the versions to a common kit lineage; the operator relationship remains unclear.
- Researchers observed 11 typosquatted domains, 10 of them fronted by Cloudflare.
- The researchers found no direct evidence of reverse-proxy tooling or automated session hijacking; OTP collection is consistent with intent to enable real-time authentication abuse or session replay.
- 1Password is monitoring the campaign and pursuing takedowns; the article advises users to avoid unsolicited links and enter credentials only on verified domains.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Breach- and security-themed emails impersonated 1Password alerts and directed recipients to typosquatted login domains.
- Fake 1Password pages collected email addresses, secret keys, and passwords; later versions also collected one-time passcodes and recovery codes.
- The kit fingerprinted browsers and devices and used bot scoring, automation checks, and HideClick cloaking to gate access and serve benign content to investigators.
- The V4 kit used staged REST API requests to manage phishing sessions and submit credentials, OTPs, and recovery codes.
- Defensive Notes
- Treat unsolicited breach or security-themed emails cautiously; avoid embedded links and navigate directly to a known 1Password sign-in URL.
- Enter credentials, one-time passcodes, and recovery codes only on verified 1Password domains.
- Monitor for anomalous authentication events, including unusual login attempts from Cloudflare-hosted infrastructure; the article notes these may indicate account compromise.
- 1Password and monitoring vendors are tracking the campaign and pursuing takedowns of malicious lookalike sites; infrastructure rotation means monitoring should continue.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | 0nepass-word[.]com | Typosquatted phishing domain used for a V3 deployment of the 1Phish kit. |
| DOMAIN | 1pass-wrd[.]com | Typosquatted phishing domain listed for a V4 deployment of the 1Phish kit. |
| DOMAIN | 1passwod[.]net | Typosquatted phishing domain used for a V3 deployment of the 1Phish kit. |
| DOMAIN | 1passwords[.]co | Malicious lookalike domain associated with a V3 phishing-kit deployment. |
| DOMAIN | 1possword[.]com | Typosquatted phishing domain used for a V3 deployment of the 1Phish kit. |
| DOMAIN | login-1password[.]com | Typosquatted phishing domain used for a fake 1Password sign-in page. |
| DOMAIN | lon-pass-word[.]com | Typosquatted phishing domain used by the 1Phish kit. |
| DOMAIN | lpasswod[.]com | Typosquatted phishing domain used for a V3 deployment of the 1Phish kit. |
| DOMAIN | on-pass-word[.]com | Typosquatted phishing domain used for a V3 deployment of the 1Phish kit. |
| DOMAIN | on-pssword[.]com | Typosquatted phishing domain used for a V4 deployment of the 1Phish kit. |
| DOMAIN | one-passw0rd[.]com | Typosquatted phishing domain used for a V3 deployment of the 1Phish kit. |
| DOMAIN | onepass-word[.]com | Typosquatted phishing domain used by the 1Phish kit, including for fingerprint telemetry. |
| DOMAIN | signin-1psswoord[.]com | Typosquatted phishing domain used for a V4 deployment of the 1Phish kit. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationV4 used obfuscated JavaScript, and earlier variants encoded browser-automation detection properties.T1056 · Input CaptureFake web forms and API endpoints captured email addresses, secret keys, passwords, OTPs, and recovery codes.T1497 · Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionBrowser/device fingerprinting, automation checks, bot scoring, and HideClick cloaking gated phishing content and presented benign pages to investigators.T1566 · PhishingBreach-themed email lures linked to typosquatted domains impersonating 1Password login pages.
