Datadog Details AiTM Phishing Campaign Targeting AWS Console Credentials

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Summary

Datadog describes an active AiTM campaign using AWS-lookalike domains and reverse-proxy phishing to harvest validated AWS Console credentials and likely OTPs. It observed console logins from Mullvad VPN infrastructure within 20 minutes; AWS is coordinating takedown work

Key points

  • The phishing kit proxies authentication to the legitimate AWS sign-in service in real time, validating submitted credentials and likely capturing OTPs and session material; OTP capture is unconfirmed.
  • Two active infrastructure clusters used cloud-recovery[.]net and cloud-policy[.]com, with a related cloud-recovery[.]us domain. The domains share Registrar ID 3254; one cluster was registered and deployed on the day it was observed.
  • Lures used AWS SES click-tracking links on awstrack[.]me and redirects through post[.]spmailtechnolo[.]com before reaching AWS-lookalike credential pages.
  • Both phishing-kit servers exposed an administrative panel on TCP port 3000, which Datadog says could provide visibility into captured credentials and campaign management.
  • Datadog observed AWS Console authentication from a Mullvad VPN egress IP within 20 minutes of credential submission; this suggests rapid use of harvested credentials, but does not establish how it was automated.
  • The campaign remained active at the time of reporting. Datadog observed updated redirect logic and expanded anti-analysis controls, and said it reported the infrastructure to AWS, which was coordinating disruption efforts.
  • Datadog recommends monitoring CloudTrail authentication events, MFA anomalies, privilege escalation, and DNS activity involving the identified domains.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A phishing lure impersonated an AWS Security Hub notification and directed victims through AWS SES click-tracking and a multi-stage redirect chain.
  • Typosquatted domains hosted high-fidelity AWS sign-in pages that proxied authentication to the legitimate AWS endpoint in real time, harvesting validated credentials and likely OTPs and session material.
  • The attacker used harvested credentials to access a compromised AWS Console account; access was observed within 20 minutes of credential submission from a Mullvad VPN egress IP.
Defensive Notes
  • Monitor CloudTrail ConsoleLogin events from the reported phishing-kit server IPs and investigate authentication from Mullvad VPN IPs.
  • Hunt for DNS activity involving the reported cloud-recovery.net and cloud-policy.com domains.
  • Review MFA anomalies and privilege-escalation activity for signs of post-phishing credential abuse.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINcloud-policy[.]comPhishing infrastructure root domain associated with Cluster 2.
DOMAINcloud-recovery[.]netPhishing infrastructure root domain associated with Cluster 1.
HOSTNAMEsignin[.]aws[.]cloud-policy[.]comCredential-harvesting hostname associated with Cluster 2.
HOSTNAMEsignin[.]aws[.]cloud-recovery[.]netCredential-harvesting hostname serving a phishing page that mimicked AWS sign-in.
IPV4178[.]16[.]54[.]142Phishing-kit server associated with Cluster 1.
IPV4185[.]209[.]196[.]132Mullvad VPN egress IP from which the attacker accessed a compromised AWS Console account.
IPV469[.]67[.]172[.]30Phishing-kit server associated with Cluster 2.

MITRE ATT&CK

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