Sysdig Maps Runtime Detections for AI Coding Agents

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Summary

Sysdig TRT observed Claude Code, Gemini CLI and Codex at the syscall level and developed Falco detections for agent installation, unauthorized configuration access, sensitive-file reads and safety-control bypass.

Key points

  • Sysdig TRT observed five agentic-loop iterations in 10 seconds, involving 64 execve events, multiple outbound HTTPS connections and a multi-level process tree.
  • Claude Code, Gemini CLI and Codex have distinct process fingerprints, so Sysdig says reliable detection requires agent-specific identification.
  • The proposed detection patterns cover agent installation, unauthorized access to agent configuration, sensitive-file reads and unsafe safety-control bypass flags.
  • The detections focus on observable system behavior rather than trying to classify prompts or identify the attack vector.
  • The article describes prompt injection through repository files, dependency documentation and other agent-processed content as a risk that can lead to credential access or configuration changes.
  • Sysdig says the rules are production-tuned and available to Sysdig Secure customers through the managed Falco rules feed.

Article Details

Defense Focus
Detect AI coding-agent threats through kernel-level observation of agent processes and their behavior, rather than attempting to classify prompts or infer intent.
Detection Methods
  • Identify Claude Code, Gemini CLI, and Codex CLI by their agent-specific executable paths, runtimes, and process ancestry.
  • Detect agent installation by monitoring package managers, download tools, and installer scripts that spawn processes matching agent installation signatures.
  • Alert when a process outside an agent's process family accesses that agent's configuration directory.
  • Detect sensitive file reads and unexpected process spawning or outbound connections associated with agent activity.
  • Match agent invocation command lines against known unsafe flags that disable built-in safety controls.
  • Tune detections with production exceptions and apply them across the three agents.
Data Sources
  • Syscall events captured with eBPF, including execve events
  • Process trees and process ancestry
  • Process command lines
  • File I/O, including access to agent configuration directories and sensitive files
  • Outbound network connections
Rule Types
  • Falco runtime detection rules for agent installation, unauthorized configuration access, sensitive file reads, and safety-control bypass
  • Process command-line matching for unsafe agent flags
Platforms
  • Developer machines and VMs
  • CI/CD pipelines
  • Kubernetes clusters
Defensive Actions
  • Use kernel-level monitoring that operates independently of the agent process.
  • Establish an inventory baseline for coding agents and investigate unexpected installations.
  • Alert on configuration-directory access by processes outside the corresponding agent process family.
  • Review and intervene on unsafe agent flags before the agent executes operations.
  • Apply production-tuned exceptions while retaining coverage across agent-specific process fingerprints.
  • Treat agent processes as privileged processes and investigate deviations from expected behavior.

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