Infiniti Stealer Uses ClickFix to Deliver a Nuitka-Compiled macOS Infostealer

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Summary

Malwarebytes reports that Infiniti Stealer uses a fake verification page and ClickFix to deliver a staged macOS stealer. The malware harvests credentials and other sensitive data, then exfiltrates it over HTTP.

Key points

  • The researchers say they tracked the previously undocumented malware as NukeChain before identifying it as Infiniti Stealer through its operator panel.
  • A fake Cloudflare verification page on update-check[.]com prompts users to paste a command into Terminal, launching the infection without exploiting a software vulnerability.
  • A Bash dropper writes a Stage 2 binary to /tmp, removes macOS quarantine flags with xattr, launches the binary, and deletes itself.
  • The Apple Silicon loader uses Nuitka onefile packaging to unpack and launch a Python 3.11 stealer.
  • The stealer targets Chromium and Firefox credentials, macOS Keychain entries, cryptocurrency wallets, developer secrets in .env files, and screenshots; it exfiltrates data via HTTP POST.
  • The malware checks for analysis environments, adds randomized delays, and sends an operator notification via Telegram after uploads complete.
  • The article recommends changing passwords from a clean device, revoking sessions and keys, checking for suspicious files, and scanning the affected Mac.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A fake Cloudflare verification page on update-check[.]com uses ClickFix social engineering to persuade users to paste and run a Terminal command.
  • The command fetches and runs a Bash dropper, which decodes and writes a Stage-2 binary to /tmp, removes its quarantine flag, launches it, and deletes itself.
  • A Nuitka-compiled loader unpacks and launches a Python 3.11 stealer that collects browser credentials, macOS Keychain entries, cryptocurrency wallets, plaintext developer secrets, and screenshots.
  • The stealer exfiltrates collected data through HTTP POST requests and sends the operator a Telegram notification when upload completes.
Defensive Notes
  • Do not paste commands into Terminal from websites; the article notes that legitimate CAPTCHA verification does not require this.
  • If affected, stop using the device for sensitive activity, change passwords from a clean device, revoke active sessions and API tokens or SSH keys, check /tmp and ~/Library/LaunchAgents/, and run a full Malwarebytes scan.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINinfiniti-stealer[.]comDomain of the Infiniti Stealer operator panel, which the article says became publicly visible.
DOMAINupdate-check[.]comMalicious delivery and staging domain serving the fake verification page and first-stage dropper.
MD5da73e42d1f9746065f061a6e85e28f0cMD5 hash identified in the article as the Infiniti Stealer dropper binary.
SHA2561e63be724bf651bb17bcf181d11bacfabef6a6360dcdfda945d6389e80f2b958SHA-256 hash identified in the article as the Stage-3 Nuitka-compiled stealer.
URLhxxps[:]//update-check[.]com/m/7d8df27d95d9Specific first-stage dropper resource on the malicious delivery domain.

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