EtherRAT Uses Ethereum Smart Contracts for C2 and Collects Extensive Host Data

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Summary

eSentire analyzed EtherRAT, a Node.js backdoor found at a retail customer in March 2026. It retrieves C2 addresses from Ethereum contracts, uses CDN-like HTTPS beacons, and runs a SYS_INFO module for host fingerprinting.

Key points

  • eSentire TRU detected EtherRAT in a retail customer environment in March 2026; its analysts isolated the affected host and supported remediation.
  • In the observed case, ClickFix used pcalua.exe to launch mshta.exe and retrieve a malicious HTA; other EtherRAT incidents used Microsoft Teams IT Support scams and QuickAssist.
  • The malware uses AES-256-CBC across staged Node.js payloads, Obfuscator.io obfuscation, and an HKCU Run key for persistence, with conhost.exe proxying node.exe.
  • EtherRAT queries Ethereum RPC providers for C2 addresses stored in a smart contract; setString events can update those addresses.
  • The backdoor polls C2 over HTTPS using CDN-like URL patterns, supports remote command execution, and can send its source code to C2 for reobfuscation.
  • A C2-delivered SYS_INFO module collects extensive host, user, operating-system, network, and security-product details; it exits if it detects specified CIS-region languages.
  • The article says EtherRAT can steal cryptocurrency wallets and cloud credentials and was reportedly linked by Sysdig to a North Korean APT through overlaps with Contagious Interview tactics.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • In the observed case, ClickFix used pcalua.exe to launch mshta.exe and retrieve the malicious shep.hta file from a compromised website.
  • TRU reports that IT Support scams over Microsoft Teams, followed by QuickAssist remote access, occur in many other EtherRAT incidents.
  • The malware stages decrypt Node.js code and execute it; the later stage writes and launches EtherRAT, which can execute commands, collect host information, and steal assets including cryptocurrency wallets and cloud credentials.
  • EtherRAT establishes persistence with an HKCU Run value that uses conhost.exe to proxy-execute node.exe. It retrieves C2 addresses from Ethereum smart-contract data and polls C2 over HTTPS using CDN-like URLs.
  • A C2-delivered SYS_INFO module checks for specified CIS-region languages and, if one matches, deletes itself and exits; otherwise, it collects extensive system and security-software information.
Defensive Notes
  • eSentire recommends disabling mshta.exe and pcalua.exe through AppLocker Group Policy or Windows Defender Application Control.
  • eSentire recommends disabling the Run prompt through Group Policy and providing phishing and security-awareness training that covers ClickFix and IT Support scams.
  • eSentire recommends blocking crypto-network RPC providers used by threat actors for payload staging.
  • eSentire's SOC analysts isolated the affected host; the team also reported ongoing monitoring of EtherRAT campaigns and development of detection content.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINaurineuroth[.]comEtherRAT C2 domain observed returning the SYS_INFO module.
DOMAINeuclidrent[.]comListed as an EtherRAT C2 domain.
DOMAINhayesmed[.]comListed as an EtherRAT C2 domain.
DOMAINjariosos[.]comListed as an EtherRAT C2 domain.
DOMAINjusttalken[.]comListed as an EtherRAT C2 domain.
DOMAINmebeliotmasiv[.]comListed as an EtherRAT C2 domain.
DOMAINo-parana[.]comListed as an EtherRAT C2 domain.
DOMAINpalshona[.]comListed as an EtherRAT C2 domain.
DOMAINregancontrols[.]comListed as an EtherRAT C2 domain.
DOMAINsalinasrent[.]comListed as an EtherRAT C2 domain.
IPV4185[.]218[.]19[.]162C2 IP address associated with aurineuroth.com.
SHA25603c4e54cc775ab819752dc5d420ab2fed03bd445c3ce398d021031100b334fb4Hash of deobfuscated EtherRAT.
SHA256294c597c89023093e1e175949f5104f887b89cd8e1cf1d3192ee9032739f259eHash of the EtherRAT MSI loader.
SHA2562edf1ab615b489e228a89c617d24f66d1e780a6d5e30f6886608dfe79325acf8Hash of the EtherRAT HTA script shep.hta.
SHA25647f74749cfcd55c8dacde2cc9b4c45282bec7a93ee19b7b81b452c99758d3370Hash of obfuscated EtherRAT stage 2.
SHA2565623f4f8942872b2b7cb6d2674c126a42bdf6ed5d1f37c1afc348529e4697d73Hash of EtherRAT stage 1.
SHA2567dd1bf7a58774a081062f5c8f183d24f95c433805e0bf73280c0adba1c71390dHash of obfuscated EtherRAT.
SHA25683b1f11c6a0bd267e415136440559131d2d4ace9a65dc221ea3b144fe0e7199bHash of the EtherRAT SYS_INFO module.
SHA256b1ee812e7c786c8696f913595658e57706d97a66ca7b7634f421f5c552e7002bHash of deobfuscated EtherRAT stage 2.
URLhxxps[:]//aurineuroth[.]com/api/5f459179/29e96c95-62a5-49e5-a8ba-7ebfbf560ab7/b435a6b1.ico?b=9e2f9c07-f85a-4089-8669-186f56bca7b3EtherRAT HTTPS beacon URL used to communicate with C2.
URLhxxps[:]//www-flow-submission-management[.]shepherdsestates[.]uk/shep.htaMalicious HTA delivery URL hosted on a website identified as compromised.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1012 · Query RegistryThe module queried registry values for Windows product information and the machine hardware identifier.T1016 · System Network Configuration DiscoveryThe SYS_INFO module collected the victim's public IP and MAC address.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationObfuscator.io was used to obfuscate EtherRAT stages.T1033 · System Owner/User DiscoveryThe SYS_INFO module collected the current username.T1057 · Process DiscoveryOn Linux and macOS, ps aux listed running processes for antivirus identification.T1059.001 · PowerShellPowerShell commands collected host language, GPU, antivirus, domain, and operating-system information.T1059.003 · Windows Command Shellcmd.exe command lines launched the ClickFix chain and ran discovery and persistence commands.T1059.007 · JavaScriptNode.js JavaScript stages decrypted and executed the malware, including through module._compile() and child_process.spawn().T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsEtherRAT polled C2 over HTTPS using randomized CDN-like beacon URLs.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryThe SYS_INFO module collected operating-system name, release, platform, and architecture.T1105 · Ingress Tool Transfercurl downloaded a portable Node.js runtime archive used to stage the malware environment.T1204 · User ExecutionThe reported initial access involved ClickFix or, in other incidents, IT Support scams prompting users to allow QuickAssist access.T1218.005 · MshtaThe ClickFix command used pcalua.exe to launch mshta.exe and retrieve the malicious HTA.T1518.001 · Security Software DiscoveryThe module queried Windows antivirus products and checked process names for antivirus software on Linux and macOS.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEtherRAT persistence used an HKCU Run value to launch node.exe through conhost.exe.

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