Microsoft Details WhatsApp-Delivered VBS Malware Campaign and Defenses

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Summary

Microsoft describes VBS scripts delivered via WhatsApp that fetch VBS and MSI payloads from cloud storage, use renamed utilities, and attempt UAC bypass. The report includes Defender detections, hunting queries, IOCs, and mitigation guidance.

Key points

  • The campaign starts with malicious VBS scripts delivered via WhatsApp; the scripts download additional VBS payloads and MSI installers from cloud storage.
  • The scripts run using wscript.exe, and renamed utilities such as curl and bitsadmin.exe are used to obscure activity.
  • The report describes attempts to read Windows UAC settings and run cmd.exe with elevated privileges to modify the registry; it does not establish that elevation succeeded.
  • Microsoft provides Defender detections and hunting queries for suspicious script execution, payload downloads, installer drops, and outbound network activity.
  • Recommended defenses include EDR in block mode, network and web protection, tamper protection, automated investigation and remediation, and attack surface reduction rules.
  • The article lists SHA-256 hashes, cloud-storage URLs, and C2 domains for detection and hunting.

Article Details

Defense Focus
Detect and mitigate the WhatsApp-delivered VBS campaign, its cloud-hosted payloads, renamed utilities, outbound C2 activity, and UAC-bypass attempts.
Detection Methods
  • Hunt for wscript.exe-launched VBS execution with command lines containing the reported download-related arguments.
  • Identify VBS or MSI file drops initiated by processes whose original file name is curl.exe.
  • Look for outbound network activity from processes with original file name curl.exe and command lines containing the reported curl arguments.
  • Use Microsoft Defender detections for Trojan:VBS/Obfuse.KPP!MTB, suspicious curl behavior, and Trojan:VBS/BypassUAC.PAA!MTB.
  • Match the reported malicious domains against workspace data using Microsoft Sentinel TI Mapping analytics.
Data Sources
  • DeviceProcessEvents
  • DeviceFileEvents
  • DeviceNetworkEvents
  • Endpoint process command lines and original file-name metadata
  • Microsoft Defender Antivirus and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts
Rule Types
  • KQL hunting queries
  • Microsoft Defender Antivirus detections
  • Microsoft Defender for Endpoint behavioral detection
Defensive Actions
  • Enable EDR in block mode, network protection, web protection, and tamper protection.
  • Enable full automated investigation and remediation.
  • Use DisableLocalAdminMerge with tamper protection to help prevent local administrators from setting antivirus exclusions.
  • Apply attack surface reduction rules to harden against misuse of legitimate binaries.
  • Maintain cloud-delivered antivirus protection and use browsers with Microsoft Defender SmartScreen support.
  • Use the published file hashes, payload URLs, and C2 domains to hunt for and investigate related activity.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINneescil[.]topDomain identified in the article as command-and-control infrastructure.
DOMAINvelthora[.]topDomain identified in the article as command-and-control infrastructure.
SHA25607c6234b02017ffee2a1740c66e84d1ad2d37f214825169c30c50a0bc2904321Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage.
SHA25615a730d22f25f87a081bb2723393e6695d2aab38c0eafe9d7058e36f4f589220Hash of an MSI installer identified as a final payload dropped from cloud storage.
SHA2561735fcb8989c99bc8b9741f2a7dbf9ab42b7855e8e9a395c21f11450c35ebb0cHash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage.
SHA2561f726b67223067f6cdc9ff5f14f32c3853e7472cebe954a53134a7bae91329f0Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage.
SHA25622b82421363026940a565d4ffbb7ce4e7798cdc5f53dda9d3229eb8ef3e0289aHash of an initial malicious VBS script delivered via WhatsApp.
SHA25657bf1c25b7a12d28174e871574d78b4724d575952c48ca094573c19bdcbb935fHash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage.
SHA2565cd4280b7b5a655b611702b574b0b48cd46d7729c9bbdfa907ca0afa55971662Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage.
SHA2565eaaf281883f01fb2062c5c102e8ff037db7111ba9585b27b3d285f416794548Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage.
SHA256613ebc1e89409c909b2ff6ae21635bdfea6d4e118d67216f2c570ba537b216bdHash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage.
SHA256630dfd5ab55b9f897b54c289941303eb9b0e07f58ca5e925a0fa40f12e752653Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage.
SHA25691ec2ede66c7b4e6d4c8a25ffad4670d5fd7ff1a2d266528548950df2a8a927aHash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage.
SHA256a2b9e0887751c3d775adc547f6c76fea3b4a554793059c00082c1c38956badc8Hash of an MSI installer identified as a final payload dropped from cloud storage.
SHA256a773bf0d400986f9bcd001c84f2e1a0b614c14d9088f3ba23ddc0c75539dc9e0Hash of an initial malicious VBS script delivered via WhatsApp.
SHA256c9e3fdd90e1661c9f90735dc14679f85985df4a7d0933c53ac3c46ec170fdcfdHash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage.
SHA256dc3b2db1608239387a36f6e19bba6816a39c93b6aa7329340343a2ab42ccd32dHash of an MSI installer identified as a final payload dropped from cloud storage.
SHA256df0136f1d64e61082e247ddb29585d709ac87e06136f848a5c5c84aa23e664a0Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage.
URLhxxps[:]//9ding[.]s3[.]ap-southeast-1[.]amazonaws[.]comCloud-storage URL identified as hosting campaign payloads.
URLhxxps[:]//bafauac[.]s3[.]ap-southeast-1[.]amazonaws[.]comCloud-storage URL identified as hosting campaign payloads.
URLhxxps[:]//f005[.]backblazeb2[.]com/file/bsbbmksSpecific Backblaze B2 resource identified as hosting campaign payloads.
URLhxxps[:]//yifubafu[.]s3[.]ap-southeast-1[.]amazonaws[.]comCloud-storage URL identified as hosting campaign payloads.

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