Microsoft Details WhatsApp-Delivered VBS Malware Campaign and Defenses

Summary
Microsoft describes VBS scripts delivered via WhatsApp that fetch VBS and MSI payloads from cloud storage, use renamed utilities, and attempt UAC bypass. The report includes Defender detections, hunting queries, IOCs, and mitigation guidance.
Key points
- The campaign starts with malicious VBS scripts delivered via WhatsApp; the scripts download additional VBS payloads and MSI installers from cloud storage.
- The scripts run using wscript.exe, and renamed utilities such as curl and bitsadmin.exe are used to obscure activity.
- The report describes attempts to read Windows UAC settings and run cmd.exe with elevated privileges to modify the registry; it does not establish that elevation succeeded.
- Microsoft provides Defender detections and hunting queries for suspicious script execution, payload downloads, installer drops, and outbound network activity.
- Recommended defenses include EDR in block mode, network and web protection, tamper protection, automated investigation and remediation, and attack surface reduction rules.
- The article lists SHA-256 hashes, cloud-storage URLs, and C2 domains for detection and hunting.
Article Details
- Defense Focus
- Detect and mitigate the WhatsApp-delivered VBS campaign, its cloud-hosted payloads, renamed utilities, outbound C2 activity, and UAC-bypass attempts.
- Detection Methods
- Hunt for wscript.exe-launched VBS execution with command lines containing the reported download-related arguments.
- Identify VBS or MSI file drops initiated by processes whose original file name is curl.exe.
- Look for outbound network activity from processes with original file name curl.exe and command lines containing the reported curl arguments.
- Use Microsoft Defender detections for Trojan:VBS/Obfuse.KPP!MTB, suspicious curl behavior, and Trojan:VBS/BypassUAC.PAA!MTB.
- Match the reported malicious domains against workspace data using Microsoft Sentinel TI Mapping analytics.
- Data Sources
- DeviceProcessEvents
- DeviceFileEvents
- DeviceNetworkEvents
- Endpoint process command lines and original file-name metadata
- Microsoft Defender Antivirus and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts
- Rule Types
- KQL hunting queries
- Microsoft Defender Antivirus detections
- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint behavioral detection
- Defensive Actions
- Enable EDR in block mode, network protection, web protection, and tamper protection.
- Enable full automated investigation and remediation.
- Use DisableLocalAdminMerge with tamper protection to help prevent local administrators from setting antivirus exclusions.
- Apply attack surface reduction rules to harden against misuse of legitimate binaries.
- Maintain cloud-delivered antivirus protection and use browsers with Microsoft Defender SmartScreen support.
- Use the published file hashes, payload URLs, and C2 domains to hunt for and investigate related activity.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | neescil[.]top | Domain identified in the article as command-and-control infrastructure. |
| DOMAIN | velthora[.]top | Domain identified in the article as command-and-control infrastructure. |
| SHA256 | 07c6234b02017ffee2a1740c66e84d1ad2d37f214825169c30c50a0bc2904321 | Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | 15a730d22f25f87a081bb2723393e6695d2aab38c0eafe9d7058e36f4f589220 | Hash of an MSI installer identified as a final payload dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | 1735fcb8989c99bc8b9741f2a7dbf9ab42b7855e8e9a395c21f11450c35ebb0c | Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | 1f726b67223067f6cdc9ff5f14f32c3853e7472cebe954a53134a7bae91329f0 | Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | 22b82421363026940a565d4ffbb7ce4e7798cdc5f53dda9d3229eb8ef3e0289a | Hash of an initial malicious VBS script delivered via WhatsApp. |
| SHA256 | 57bf1c25b7a12d28174e871574d78b4724d575952c48ca094573c19bdcbb935f | Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | 5cd4280b7b5a655b611702b574b0b48cd46d7729c9bbdfa907ca0afa55971662 | Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | 5eaaf281883f01fb2062c5c102e8ff037db7111ba9585b27b3d285f416794548 | Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | 613ebc1e89409c909b2ff6ae21635bdfea6d4e118d67216f2c570ba537b216bd | Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | 630dfd5ab55b9f897b54c289941303eb9b0e07f58ca5e925a0fa40f12e752653 | Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | 91ec2ede66c7b4e6d4c8a25ffad4670d5fd7ff1a2d266528548950df2a8a927a | Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | a2b9e0887751c3d775adc547f6c76fea3b4a554793059c00082c1c38956badc8 | Hash of an MSI installer identified as a final payload dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | a773bf0d400986f9bcd001c84f2e1a0b614c14d9088f3ba23ddc0c75539dc9e0 | Hash of an initial malicious VBS script delivered via WhatsApp. |
| SHA256 | c9e3fdd90e1661c9f90735dc14679f85985df4a7d0933c53ac3c46ec170fdcfd | Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | dc3b2db1608239387a36f6e19bba6816a39c93b6aa7329340343a2ab42ccd32d | Hash of an MSI installer identified as a final payload dropped from cloud storage. |
| SHA256 | df0136f1d64e61082e247ddb29585d709ac87e06136f848a5c5c84aa23e664a0 | Hash of a malicious VBS script dropped from cloud storage. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//9ding[.]s3[.]ap-southeast-1[.]amazonaws[.]com | Cloud-storage URL identified as hosting campaign payloads. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//bafauac[.]s3[.]ap-southeast-1[.]amazonaws[.]com | Cloud-storage URL identified as hosting campaign payloads. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//f005[.]backblazeb2[.]com/file/bsbbmks | Specific Backblaze B2 resource identified as hosting campaign payloads. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//yifubafu[.]s3[.]ap-southeast-1[.]amazonaws[.]com | Cloud-storage URL identified as hosting campaign payloads. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1036 · MasqueradingThe campaign renamed legitimate utilities, including curl and bitsadmin.exe, to evade detection.T1059.005 · Visual BasicMalicious VBS scripts were executed on endpoints using wscript.exe.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsThe report describes HTTP(S) communication with the campaign's C2 domains.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe scripts downloaded additional VBS payloads and MSI installers from cloud storage.T1204.002 · Malicious FileUsers downloaded and executed malicious VBS scripts delivered via WhatsApp.T1548.002 · Bypass User Account ControlThe activity attempted to read Windows UAC settings and run cmd.exe with elevated privileges for registry modifications.
People
Vendors
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Microsoft Defender Antimalware PlatformMicrosoft Defender Security Research details a campaign in which malicious VBS scripts delivered via WhatsApp download additional VBS payloads and MSI installers from cloud storage, leveraging renamed system utilitiesMicrosoft Defender Antiviruscloud-delivered protectionâ¯in Microsoft Defender Antivirus or the equivalent for your antivirus product to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques.Microsoft Security CopilotCustomers can use Microsoft Sentinel TI Mapping analytics and Microsoft Security Copilot integrations to map IOCs, investigate, and respond to incidents.Microsoft SentinelCustomers can use Microsoft Sentinel TI Mapping analytics and Microsoft Security Copilot integrations to map IOCs, investigate, and respond to incidents.WhatsAppMicrosoft Defender Security Research details a campaign in which malicious VBS scripts delivered via WhatsApp download additional VBS payloads and MSI installers from cloud storage, leveraging renamed system utilities
