UAT-10362 Uses LucidRook Malware in Spear-Phishing Campaigns Targeting Taiwanese NGOs

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Summary

Cisco Talos attributes campaigns targeting Taiwanese NGOs and suspected universities to UAT-10362. The group uses archive lures and DLL side-loading to deploy LucidRook, a Lua-based stager, with geofencing and compromised infrastructure.

Key points

  • Cisco Talos says it discovered the activity in October 2025 and attributes it to the previously undocumented cluster UAT-10362.
  • RAR or 7-Zip archive lures deliver LucidPawn, which uses DLL side-loading to launch LucidRook.
  • One infection chain uses a PDF-icon LNK file and PowerShell; another uses a purported Trend Micro executable that acts as a .NET dropper.
  • LucidRook is an obfuscated 64-bit DLL with an embedded Lua 5.4.8 interpreter; Talos says it collects and exfiltrates system information, then decrypts and runs Lua bytecode.
  • LucidPawn checks for the Traditional Chinese system language (zh-TW) and continues only when it matches.
  • The operators reportedly use OAST services and compromised FTP servers for command and control. A LucidKnight variant can exfiltrate system information through Gmail.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Spear-phishing archives in RAR or 7-Zip format targeted Taiwanese NGOs and suspected universities.
  • An LNK file disguised with a PDF icon launches a PowerShell script, which runs index.exe and uses DLL side-loading to execute LucidPawn; LucidPawn then side-loads LucidRook.
  • A purported Trend Micro executable, Cleanup.exe, acts as a .NET dropper and uses DLL side-loading to execute LucidRook.
  • LucidRook collects system information, exfiltrates it to an external server, and receives encrypted Lua bytecode for decryption and execution.
  • LucidPawn checks the system UI language and continues only when it matches zh-TW.
  • Talos reports that the actors used an OAST service and compromised FTP servers for command and control; a LucidKnight variant exfiltrates system information via Gmail to a temporary email address.
Defensive Notes
  • The article does not provide specific mitigation, patching, or remediation guidance.

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