Socket Tracks 73 Open VSX Extensions Linked to GlassWorm, Including Six Activated to Deliver Malware

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Summary

Socket reports 73 Open VSX extensions linked to GlassWorm, with at least six activated to deliver malware. The investigation describes cloned listings, dependency-based delivery, native binaries, and obfuscated JavaScript loaders.

Key points

  • Socket tracks 73 impersonation or suspicious extensions; at least six have reportedly been activated to deliver malware, while the others are classified as high-confidence sleepers or suspicious.
  • Cloned extension listings imitate legitimate projects to attract installs before malicious functionality is introduced.
  • Some extensions use extensionPack or extensionDependencies for transitive delivery; others retrieve VSIX payloads hosted on GitHub.
  • Some variants load platform-specific .node binaries containing installer logic; others use obfuscated JavaScript to retrieve and install payloads.
  • The reported installer commands target VS Code, Cursor, Windsurf, and VSCodium.
  • Socket says it has marked the tracked extensions on its GlassWorm v2 page while analysis continues.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Impersonation extensions are published to Open VSX as benign sleeper packages, then updated to deliver malware through the normal extension update path.
  • Extensions use extensionPack or extensionDependencies to install a separate malicious component through transitive delivery.
  • Extensions retrieve VSIX payloads from GitHub-hosted releases.
  • Platform-specific native .node binaries contain installer logic and embedded GitHub release URLs.
  • Obfuscated JavaScript decodes at runtime to retrieve and install VSIX payloads.
  • Downloaded extensions are installed across IDEs using CLI commands such as --install-extension.
  • Earlier variants used Solana transaction memos as dead drops for runtime payload retrieval.
Defensive Notes
  • Socket marked the tracked extensions on its GlassWorm v2 page and said it was protecting tracked listings while analysis continued.
  • The article warns that cloned listings can closely imitate legitimate extensions, including their names, icons, descriptions, and README content.
  • The article notes that extension source code may not reveal the behavior implemented in bundled native binaries or retrieved payloads.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
SHA2561b62b7c2ed7cc296ce821f977ef7b22bae59ef1dcdb9a34ae19467ee39bcf168SHA-256 hash identified in the article for a native installer binary used in the campaign.
SHA2564ebfe8f66ca7e9751060b3301b5e8838d6017593cdae748541de83bfa28183bdSHA-256 hash identified in the article for a native installer binary used in the campaign.
SHA25697c275e3406ad6576529f41604ad138c5bdc4297d195bf61b049e14f6b30adfdSHA-256 hash identified in the article for a downloaded VSIX payload.

MITRE ATT&CK

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