KongTuke Uses Microsoft Teams to Deploy ModeloRAT and Establish Persistence

· Original article ↗

Summary

ReliaQuest reports that KongTuke uses Microsoft Teams social engineering to deliver ModeloRAT via PowerShell. The campaign can establish persistent access in under five minutes and uses multiple access paths and persistence mechanisms.

Key points

  • ReliaQuest observed KongTuke using external Microsoft Teams chats for initial access, alongside its web-based lures.
  • Attackers impersonate IT support and trick employees into running a malicious PowerShell command.
  • The command downloads a ZIP archive from Dropbox containing a portable WinPython environment that launches ModeloRAT.
  • ModeloRAT can collect system and user information, capture screenshots, and exfiltrate files.
  • The reported malware uses a five-server C2 pool with failover, randomized URL paths, and self-update capability.
  • Separate RAT, reverse-shell, and TCP-backdoor access paths provide alternatives if one channel is disrupted.
  • Persistence methods include Run keys, Startup shortcuts, VBScript launchers, and SYSTEM-level scheduled tasks; ReliaQuest says a scheduled task can survive the malware’s self-destruct routine and system reboots.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • KongTuke uses external Microsoft Teams chats and impersonates IT or help-desk staff to socially engineer employees.
  • Unicode whitespace in display names is used to make the attacker appear to be legitimate internal support.
  • Victims are tricked into pasting and running a malicious PowerShell command that downloads a ZIP archive from Dropbox and installs ModeloRAT.
  • ModeloRAT establishes persistence through Run keys, Startup shortcuts, VBScript launchers, and SYSTEM-level scheduled tasks.
  • ModeloRAT collects system and user information, captures screenshots, and can exfiltrate files from the host.
  • The malware uses a five-server C2 pool with automatic failover and randomized URL paths, and maintains separate infrastructure for a primary RAT, reverse shell, and TCP backdoor.
Defensive Notes
  • Restrict external Microsoft Teams federation using allowlists to block unsolicited external chats.
  • Use the indicators of compromise in ReliaQuest's report to hunt for attacks, signs of compromise, and persistence artifacts.
  • Check for SYSTEM-level scheduled tasks during cleanup; the article says the task may survive reboots and is not removed by the implant's self-destruct routine.

MITRE ATT&CK

Threat Actors

Malware

Products

Tools

Related Articles