Two Tirol Companies Recount EGLO Ransomware Attack and Localmind Intrusion

Summary
A report details EGLO’s 2022 ransomware incident and Localmind’s 2025 cloud intrusion, tracing their entry points, impact and recovery. Localmind says investigators found no evidence of systematic data exfiltration and that on-prem systems were unaffected.
Key points
- EGLO said attackers used a stolen Citrix account to enter its network in late June 2022, gained enterprise administrator privileges and moved undetected for about three weeks before deploying ransomware on July 18.
- At EGLO, 140 of 180 servers and 500 of 1,800 devices were affected; deliveries stopped for 10 days. The company said no sensitive or business-critical data was stolen and restored data from backups.
- Localmind’s incident report identified an externally reachable beta instance that granted new accounts administrator privileges and an exposed automation system where access keys could be read. The company says the weakness may have been exploitable from September 9, 2025; the attacker claimed it had been open for at least seven months.
- The Localmind attacker reportedly moved through the automation environment and accessed a CRM database containing customer contacts. Forensics found no evidence of systematic data exfiltration, and the company said its customers’ on-premises environments were unaffected.
- Localmind reported no encryption or ransom demand. The attacker sent a memorandum describing the intrusion; the company also reported fake founder profiles and attempted access to executives’ personal social-media accounts. The regional criminal investigation office took the case.
- EGLO rebuilt its network and introduced measures including a 24/7 security operations center, multifactor authentication and privileged access management. Localmind removed critical automation nodes, arranged external penetration testing and rebuilt its cloud infrastructure with data-center partners.
Article Details
- Victim Organization
- EGLO (Eglo Leuchten) and Localmind GmbH
- Victim Domain
- Unknown
- Incident Type
- EGLO: ransomware attack following use of stolen Citrix account credentials. Localmind: intrusion into an externally accessible beta instance and connected automation environment, followed by access to infrastructure information and a CRM database; the attacker also allegedly created fake social media profiles and attempted access to executives' private accounts.
- Incident Date
- 2022-07-18
- Data Types Exposed
- EGLO reported that no sensitive or business-critical data was stolen.
- Localmind customer contacts in a CRM database were accessible to the intruder; the investigation found no evidence of systematic data exfiltration.
- Affected Records
- Not disclosed
- Affected Data Size
- Not disclosed
- Operational Impact
- EGLO: 140 of 180 servers and 500 of 1,800 devices were affected; deliveries stopped for ten days. SAP was restored after ten days, and 99% of systems were stable after three weeks. Data was restored from backups. Localmind: its cloud infrastructure was affected, and more than 150 customers were contacted. The article reports no disruption or compromise of customers' on-premises environments.
- Ransom Or Extortion
- EGLO attackers encrypted data, left ransom notes, and demanded payment; EGLO did not pay. Localmind's attacker did not encrypt data or demand a ransom, but sent a memorandum to company stakeholders, political parties, media, and prospective customers. Localmind described the conduct as indicating destructive intent; the identity and motive of the attacker were not established.
- Claim Status
- confirmed
MITRE ATT&CK
T1078 · Valid AccountsThe EGLO attackers used a stolen account to access the network and subsequently obtained Enterprise Admin privileges.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationThe Localmind intruder exploited a flaw in an externally accessible beta instance, according to the incident account.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactThe EGLO attackers deployed ransomware that encrypted data.
People
Products
Citrixin der Nacht, aber der Angreifer hatte das Netzwerk bereits Ende Juni betreten – über einen gestohlenen Citrix-Account, ein Fernzugriffsprotokoll, das in Unternehmen weitverbreitet ist. Schritt für Schritt eignete erNotionDort findet er einen Integrations-Node, der von einem Mitarbeiter mit Zugangsdaten zur Wissensdatenbank Notion befüllt wurde. Über Notion erkennt er, wie die Infrastruktur des Unternehmens aufgebaut ist. Von dortSAPNetzwerk wird aufgebaut, jedes Gerät einzeln überprüft. Nach zehn Tagen läuft das zentrale ERP-System SAP wieder, nach drei Wochen sind 99 Prozent der Systeme stabil. Alle Daten können aus Back-ups
