Unit 42 Finds Malicious OpenClaw Skills Evading Scanners and Abusing AI Agents

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Summary

Unit 42 identified five malicious ClawHub skills that delivered macOS infostealers, bypassed scanners with 22 MB of file padding, or abused agents for affiliate manipulation and token front-running. OpenClaw removed the skills and banned accounts.

Key points

  • OpenClaw skills can use an agent’s access to local files, shells, and credentials to carry out actions through its authenticated sessions.
  • Unit 42 found five malicious skills on ClawHub between February and May 2026, despite screening with VirusTotal and ClawScan; OpenClaw removed them and banned associated accounts.
  • Two skills delivered macOS infostealers using deceptive prerequisite instructions and remote payloads; one payload was identified as cluw.
  • The omnicogg skill padded its README.md file with 22 MB of data to exceed scanner processing thresholds.
  • The money-radar skill fetched product and referral data from laosji[.]net and directed agents to recommend operator-controlled affiliate links.
  • The letssendit skill coordinated agents to pool SOL and buy a meme token before its public launch, in a scheme Unit 42 characterized as agentic front-running.
  • The article recommends verifying skill publishers, auditing package source files, and monitoring outbound network traffic.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Malicious ClawHub skills disguised as productivity or financial tools used prerequisite instructions to direct agents to paste-site content and execute Base64-encoded payloads through a terminal.
  • A malicious skill delivered a macOS infostealer after fetching its payload from remote infrastructure.
  • An auto-updater skill registered cron jobs to preserve C2 communication.
  • A skill padded its README.md with 22 MB of characters to evade scanners that skip oversized files.
  • A financial-advisor skill fetched remotely controlled referral data and instructed the agent to use affiliate links in recommendations.
  • A skill coordinated AI agents to pool cryptocurrency for an operator's meme-token purchase and subsequent sale.
Defensive Notes
  • Verify skill publisher provenance and audit package source files before installation.
  • Monitor outbound network traffic and compare external connections against each skill's documented behavior.
  • Use skill screening and analysis tools, while accounting for oversized files that may evade content-analysis thresholds.
  • Block the letssendit skill across enterprise AI infrastructure, as recommended in the article.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINdownload[.]setup-service[.]comListed in the article's domains, IP addresses, and URLs associated with the reported activity.
DOMAINinstall[.]app-distribution[.]netListed in the article's domains, IP addresses, and URLs associated with the reported activity.
DOMAINlaosji[.]netDomain identified as previously observed in paste-jacking campaigns and used to serve remotely controlled affiliate referral data.
HOSTNAMEopenclawcli[.]vercel[.]appHostname listed among indicators associated with the reported activity.
IPV42[.]26[.]75[.]16C2 and payload infrastructure used to deliver the cluw macOS infostealer.
IPV491[.]92[.]242[.]30C2 server associated with AMOS delivery; the article reports it continued receiving new skill deliveries.
SHA256818aea6143282b352fdfdc0f3ebf77a36e54eb3befb5cad1a355a99ab97c6aa7Hash of the cluw macOS infostealer payload.
SHA256881ce5cb124c4d2e814783724cc1388f6a1cbf6eee274c3f3366e77ba3503ad7Listed among the article's hashes for malicious skills and payloads.
SHA256b30eaed1f7478c28f4ec50d07ed5ef014ffbc4b2bc5a38d689ba9f7abb5e19c2Hash of the omnicogg skill, which delivered AMOS and used file padding to evade scanning.
SHA256b6c7e0bf573b1c7d9d3a05eb08d26579199515b847df984862805f44a7af8007Hash of the malicious TradingView-assistant skill package described in the article.
SHA256ebb73dbb5aac1f6fe1a88e8f26126a1e1aa34c9f3345ad4345189b40d9bf1d1dHash of the money-radar skill that fetched attacker-controlled affiliate referral data.
SHA256f4e41aa269c88bf11a2022701a9cf41e9a186aa1b224d837c31bf34e0b875d0eHash listed for the letssendit skill used in the agentic front-running scheme.
URLhxxps[:]//rentry[.]co/openclaw-codePaste-site redirect lure that supplied malicious instructions for the skill's prerequisite.

MITRE ATT&CK

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