Hack a Water Tower: OT Security Demo and Just Hacking Announcements

Summary

A guest demonstrates how weakly protected HMI access, a software-PLC reverse shell and Modbus man-in-the-middle tampering can overflow a simulated water tower. The discussion recommends keeping PLCs off the public internet and separating OT from IT.

Key points

• A guest demonstrates attacks in a virtual water-treatment plant; the scenarios are simulations, not a reported compromise of a live facility.
• The demo shows how access to an HMI can expose PLC tags and set points; the speakers say some administrative interfaces may lack authentication.
• In the simulation, changing a chemical-dosing duration from 2 to 200 seconds increases the displayed disinfectant concentration.
• The presenter uses a Python hardware-layer feature in a software PLC to obtain a root reverse shell in the lab.
• A man-in-the-middle proxy alters float readings so the simulated PLC does not register the tower's high water level, allowing it to overflow.
• The speakers recommend keeping PLCs off the public internet and separating critical infrastructure and OT networks from ordinary IT networks.
• The presenter cautions that the water-tower scenario is simplified and says mechanical safeguards in real systems could prevent the modeled overflow.

Vendors