Behavioral Monitoring Can Detect BYOVD Attacks That Evade Driver Blocklists

Summary
A Symantec whitepaper explains how BYOVD lets attackers use signed but vulnerable Windows drivers to disable AV/EDR, argues kernel hardening and blocklists have limits, and recommends behavioral monitoring of driver interactions and anomalous IOCTLs.
Key points
- BYOVD abuses flaws in validly signed Windows kernel drivers to give attackers kernel-level control.
- The article describes attackers using vulnerable drivers to terminate security processes, strip their rights, or suppress kernel notifications.
- Examples of BYOVD tools discussed include TrueSightKiller, GhostDriver, AuKill, and Poortry.
- The article says kernel hardening features such as KASLR, HVCI, and KCFG do not prevent data-only attacks that alter information the kernel already holds.
- Driver blocklists can lag behind newly identified drivers, while signatures can be evaded by reimplementing tools.
- The whitepaper recommends behavioral monitoring for anomalous driver interactions and IOCTL activity, such as requests to terminate security products or remove callbacks.
Article Details
- Defense Focus
- Detect BYOVD through behavioral monitoring of driver interactions and anomalous IOCTL activity that targets security products, rather than relying primarily on driver blocklists or file hashes.
- Detection Methods
- Monitor the sequence of a vulnerable driver being dropped to disk, a service being created and started to load it, process enumeration, and subsequent IOCTL activity.
- Flag anomalous IOCTL requests that attempt to terminate security-product processes, strip their handles, or remove callbacks.
- Use behavioral detection that identifies suspicious driver interactions without depending on prior identification of the driver.
- Data Sources
- Driver file activity and driver interactions
- Service creation and startup activity associated with loading a driver
- Process enumeration and security-process activity
- IOCTL traffic, including requests involving process termination, handle stripping, and callback removal
- Platforms
- Windows endpoints
- Defensive Actions
- Prioritize behavioral monitoring of driver interactions over reliance on static driver hashes or blocklists alone.
- Use the Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist as a supplementary control, accounting for update delays and incomplete coverage.
- Treat Windows kernel-hardening features as supplementary protections rather than the primary defense against data-only BYOVD attacks.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1014 · RootkitSome attackers manipulate kernel records so security products stop receiving notifications about activity on the machine.T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege EscalationAttackers exploit flaws in validly signed kernel drivers to gain kernel-level control and higher privileges.T1202 · Indirect Command ExecutionThe malicious component sends a crafted IOCTL command to a vulnerable driver to make it perform a privileged action.T1547.006 · Kernel Modules and ExtensionsAttackers load a vulnerable signed driver and use it to carry out kernel-level actions.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsBYOVD tooling can terminate security-product processes, strip their rights, or otherwise impair AV and EDR.
Vendors
Carbon Black[Software / vendor names ] Security products and utilities referenced in the attack chain – Process Explorer, Symantec, Carbon Black EndpointMicrosoftMicrosoft hardening features such as KASLR, HVCI, and KCFG help, but do not stop data-only BYOVD attacks.SymantecSymantec’s whitepaper explains how tools like TrueSightKiller, GhostDriver, AuKill, and Poortry exploit this tactic and why behavioral monitoring is more effective than blocklists or kernel hardening alone.
Products
Tools
AuKillSymantec’s whitepaper explains how tools like TrueSightKiller, GhostDriver, AuKill, and Poortry exploit this tactic and why behavioral monitoring is more effective than blocklists or kernel hardening alone.GhostDriverSymantec’s whitepaper explains how tools like TrueSightKiller, GhostDriver, AuKill, and Poortry exploit this tactic and why behavioral monitoring is more effective than blocklists or kernel hardening alone.PoortrySymantec’s whitepaper explains how tools like TrueSightKiller, GhostDriver, AuKill, and Poortry exploit this tactic and why behavioral monitoring is more effective than blocklists or kernel hardening alone.TrueSightKillerSymantec’s whitepaper explains how tools like TrueSightKiller, GhostDriver, AuKill, and Poortry exploit this tactic and why behavioral monitoring is more effective than blocklists or kernel hardening alone.
