Sysdig Details AI-Agent-Assisted Ransomware Attack via Langflow

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Summary

Sysdig reports that JadePuffer exploited CVE-2025-3248 in an exposed Langflow instance, using an LLM to find credentials, move to a production server, exploit Nacos, and encrypt 1,342 service configuration items.

Key points

  • Sysdig says JadePuffer exploited CVE-2025-3248, a critical missing-authentication flaw, to gain code execution on an internet-exposed Langflow instance.
  • The LLM-assisted activity searched for secrets, dumped Langflow’s Postgres database, scanned internal services, probed for MinIO, and installed a cron job for persistence.
  • Sysdig observed the LLM adapting actions in real time, extracting credentials from different file types, and logging into discovered endpoints.
  • The actor pivoted to a production server hosting MySQL and Nacos, using root database credentials and Nacos authentication-bypass and JWT-forgery techniques, according to Sysdig.
  • The attack injected a backdoor Nacos administrator and encrypted 1,342 service configuration items; Sysdig says the randomly generated encryption key was not saved or transmitted.
  • Sysdig says analyzed payloads showed the LLM correcting failed actions and responding to free-text context; it warns defenders to secure exposed application servers, configuration stores, and internet-facing database administration accounts.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • JadePuffer exploited CVE-2025-3248 to access an internet-exposed Langflow instance and execute Python code on its host.
  • The actor used the LLM to search files and configuration data for secrets, dump the Langflow Postgres database, scan reachable internal addresses and services, and probe for MinIO addresses.
  • A cron job was deployed to maintain access to the Langflow server.
  • The actor used root credentials to reach a production server and targeted Nacos through an authentication bypass, JWT forgery using its default signing key, and injection of a backdoor administrator into the backing database.
  • The attack encrypted 1,342 Nacos service configuration items and included an extortion demand.
Defensive Notes
  • Sysdig advises treating exposed application servers, unhardened configuration stores, and internet-facing database administrator accounts as priority attack surfaces.
  • The article highlights the risk of Nacos's well-known default JWT signing key and recommends attention to configuration-store hardening.

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