Attackers Abuse MDM Platforms to Deploy Remote-Access Tools

· Original article ↗

Summary

Huntress describes two incidents in which phishing or a deceptive link led to unauthorized Hexnode or Rippling MDM enrollment, letting attackers install ScreenConnect and restore remote access after removal.

Key points

  • Huntress reports attackers misused legitimate Hexnode and Rippling MDM platforms; the incidents did not involve exploiting vulnerabilities in those products.
  • In the Hexnode case, proposal-themed phishing delivered an MSI disguised as a DocuSign installer that installed Hexnode components.
  • The attacker used Hexnode to install ScreenConnect; after an MSP removed it, the tool reappeared hours later and connected to the same relay, prompting endpoint isolation and remediation.
  • In the Rippling case, a link impersonating a Microsoft Teams invitation led to MDM enrollment; the agent was installed with SYSTEM-level permissions, and ScreenConnect followed about 35 minutes later.
  • Huntress traced the Rippling activity to the online management agent, suggesting the attacker had created an account to conduct the attack.
  • Huntress recommends correlating unexpected MDM enrollments, management agents, RMM installations, and unfamiliar outbound relay connections across identity, endpoint, and network telemetry.
  • Recommended response includes isolating the endpoint, removing it from the unauthorized MDM tenant, disabling attacker-created accounts, revoking sessions or tokens, resetting affected credentials, and reimaging if integrity is uncertain.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Phishing emails used business-themed proposal, document-signing, tax-planning, and meeting lures to get recipients to click links.
  • A fake DocuSign-named MSI installed legitimate Hexnode MDM components; in another incident, a lookalike Teams page redirected to a PHP file that facilitated enrollment in an attacker-controlled Rippling MDM tenant.
  • After MDM enrollment, the attackers used the privileged management path to install or reinstall ScreenConnect and connect to external relays.
Defensive Notes
  • Inventory authorized MDM products, tenants, agents, and RMM instances; treat unexpected enrollments, management agents, or RMM installations as security events.
  • Train users to verify unexpected meeting, document-signing, and proposal-review requests, and scrutinize business-themed lures with email and web controls.
  • Correlate identity, MDM, endpoint, and network telemetry, including enrollment activity, RMM installations, and outbound connections to unfamiliar relays.
  • For suspected compromise, isolate the endpoint, remove it from the unauthorized MDM tenant, disable attacker-created accounts, revoke active sessions or tokens, reset affected credentials, and reimage the endpoint if its integrity cannot be confirmed.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
URLhxxps[:]//teams-microsoftcom5d41402abc4b2a76b9719d911017c592[.]kiratham[.]com/teams/?c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849bLookalike Teams URL used to present a page titled “Calendar” in the Rippling incident.
URLhxxps[:]//teams-microsoftcom5d41402abc4b2a76b9719d911017c592[.]kiratham[.]com/teams/14/enroll14.phpLookalike Teams URL used to facilitate enrollment in the attacker-controlled Rippling MDM tenant.
URLhxxps[:]//webdocusign[.]viewportal[.]es/Windows/download/index.phpDelivery URL for the fake DocuSign/proposal installer that installed Hexnode components.

MITRE ATT&CK

People

Vendors

Products

Tools

Related Articles